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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis sought to present the manning challenges that affect the Hungarian 
Special Operations Forces development, especially in the case of its main combative 
element—the 2nd SOF Group—using the recruitment, assessment, selection, training, 
and retention (RAST-R) framework. It also aspired to identify ways and means to revise 
and improve this framework, with the view of increasing the number of members, and 
then finding, training, and retaining the right SOF operator talent. To that end, this thesis 
conducted a comparative research of the Hungarian and six international countries’ SOF-
related RAST-R strategies. The analysis revealed that SOF recruits members effectively 
through the use of media, but decisive success is gained when active SOF members 
conduct face-to-face meetings. The assessment, as part of the pre-selection procedure, 
brings more possible recruits if it is conducted offsite, where potential talent could be 
found. The standards and requirements for joining and selecting are not—and cannot 
be—decreased to boost the number of candidates to maintain quality above quantity. The 
organizational culture is a key part of the employer brand that eventuates the sustainable 
RAST-R cycle. The thesis recommends feasible approaches to improve the 2nd SOF 
Group’s RAST-R processes in terms of the SOF organizational culture development, the 
research-based targeted recruitment, and the necessity of pre-selection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) units have been in high demand over the 
past decades, and nothing indicates this [situation] will change in the near 
future. An oft-voiced concern within the SOF community is that the 
standards and requirements for joining a SOF unit are being lowered in 
order to fill expanding force structures. Physical strength, stamina, excellent 
marksmanship, and unorthodox problem solving remain at the core of 
SOF’s self-image and identity. But is it self-evident that these traits will 
remain essential? 
—James D. Kiras, Special Operations Journal 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Hungary’s Special Operations Forces (HUN SOF)1 are facing the challenge of 
overstretch and personnel attrition, for a variety of reasons. Effective manning strategy is 
a challenge not only in the present but for the future of the 2nd Special Operations Forces 
Group (MH 2nd vitéz Betralan Árpád Különleges Rendeltetésű Dandár) of the Hungarian 
Defence Forces (HDF). On the one hand, negative demographic trends—explained by 
declining birth rates—restrict SOF recruitment. On the other hand, the civilian job 
market—both domestic and foreign—which provides more economic opportunities, 
impacts recruitment and retention of highly skilled personnel. For example, the Hungarian 
SOF has seen a decreasing number of volunteers (especially from the “generation Z” 
demographic layer) due to the higher salaries paid by civilian jobs, or the prospect of an 
exciting opportunity in another company.2  
Likewise, many of the already-trained and experienced enlisted personnel, non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers within the SOF have chosen to leave the SOF 
 
1 The HUN SOF has multiple higher echelon leadership components, including; organizations under 
the MoD, or directly under the Hungarian Defence Forces Command (HDFC), such as the Special 
Operations Inspectorate (SOI).  
2 Kissné András Klára, “A Magyar Honvédség hivatásos és szerződéses állományának, valamint a 
versenyszféra motiváltságának összehasonlító elemzése,” 2014, https://doi.org/10.17625/NKE.2014.002. p. 
29. The author defines Gen. Z as the first global generation, born between 1995 and 2009. 
2 
to work for private security companies (PSCs)3 or for domestic or foreign companies 
(especially those that operate in other EU countries). In sum, these factors have caused a 
decline in the pool of candidates willing to join the SOF, in parallel with a significant loss 
of trained personnel.4 
Therefore, these challenges have also affected the 2nd SOF Group, created in 2017, 
despite the Group’s significant potential to pursue its manning efforts internally. Indeed, 
while the integration of the 34th Special Forces Battalion and the 88th Light Infantry 
Battalion enabled the newly created brigade to bypass many inhibitory administrative 
factors5 which in turn allowed the brigade to attract trained and motivated infantry soldiers 
to the Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG), this integration has not improved career 
paths in the SOF spectrum entirely; hence, acquiring candidates with years of experience 
and infantry skills from the former 88th Light Infantry Battalion ceased after a promising 
start.  
The declining rate of volunteers coupled with the degree of personnel 
fluctuation6—while not critical for the 2nd SOF Group in terms of current operational 
capability and readiness—negatively effects the 2nd SOF Group’s effectiveness and 
promises to be an escalating concern in the future. Indeed, SOF operators express7 that 
 
3 Christopher Spearin, “Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divides,” 
Parameters 36, no. 4 (December 22, 2006): 58, https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-161012380/
special-operations-forces-a-strategic-resource-public. 
4 Additional challenges emerge from such expensive and exhaustive professional development 
standards as lengthy and expensive training, which conflict with the demand for rapid readiness. 
5 The administrative reassignment procedures became less bureaucratic, and the cooperation, and 
exchange training between the two elements turned more recent. 
6 From the 2nd SOF Group’s perspective the fluctuation in this case represents a ratio between the 
exiting SOF operators— and SOF enabler personnel, and the newly trained and integrated soldiers, 
especially SOF operators. 
7 Todd South, “2-Star Responds to Anonymous Email Blasting Watered-down Special Forces Training 
Standards,” Army Times, November 30, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/11/30/2-
star-responds-to-anonymous-email-blasting-watered-down-special-forces-training-standards/. 
3 
“the bar is being lowered …in terms of selection standards and criteria, in order to expand 
or simply maintain the current size of national SOF organizations.”8  
In sum, the 2nd SOF Group’s goal is not necessarily to overstaff in terms of 
manpower, but rather to achieve a healthy, manageable recruitment pace while maintaining 
a predictable rate of personnel fluctuation—in other words, to effectively balance quality 
versus quantity.9 
In this context, this study investigates how HUN SOF could overcome these 
challenges to establish and maintain successful force generation in the future to fill the 
positions in the 2nd SOF Group, which embodies the only combative special operations 
forces element of the HDF. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aspires to answer the following research question: what kind of 
recruitment strategy should the 2nd SOF Group devise and implement in line with the 
HDF’s recruitment campaign to select, train, and retain the most capable individuals to 
effectively carry out the brigade’s main roles and missions?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the last five to ten years, the security situation in the Central Eastern European 
(CEE) region has become more precarious; great power relations have reorganized. The 
role and importance of military security have been re-evaluated from the Hungarian 
national perspective, together with the regional aspect.10 As part of the CEE region, 
Hungary must prepare for hybrid threats, as well as an increasing trend of extremism and 
related terrorism that have emerged from complex sources.  
 
8 James Kiras, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, and Nicolaj Juul Nielsen, “Introduction: Recruiting and 
Organizing to Meet Future SOF Challenges,” Special Operations Journal 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 1–5, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2019.1581423, 1 
9 “USSOCOM,” accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths. 
10 MTI, “Katonai együttműködésre készülnek a V4-ek,” Neokohn, September 20, 2019, 
https://neokohn.hu/2019/09/20/katonai-egyuttmukodesre-keszulnek-a-v4-ek/. 
4 
Although Hungary is a member of the most important collective defense 
organization, NATO, and a member of the new regional cooperation as the Visegrád 4 
(V4),11 Hungary must rely on its national self-sufficiency development as well. In this 
case, the optimal and sustainable manning of the 2nd SOF Group is highly relevant from 
both the coalition and national defense perspective.  
In this connection, Dr. Imre Porkoláb stresses in the Szervezeti innováció a Magyar 
Honvédségben: az ember-gép szimbiózisa a stertégia elméletek tükrében (Organizational 
Innovation in the Hungarian Defence Forces: Symbiosis of the human and machine in the 
light of strategic theories) that the HDF is currently under the institutional adaptation phase 
of a new strategic paradigm shift. He notes that the key to success is to be able to manage 
the accompanying organizational culture change in accordance with the enormous digital 
transformation: “The stakes are huge! Organizations that are able to successfully overcome 
this hurdle will make a generational leap, and those that fail will be forced to fight 
adversaries with the attitudes and methods of bygone eras.”12 Dr. Porkoláb emphasizes 
that accelerating individual and organizational learning and adaptation processes is 
essential. He concludes that if the HDF is not able to keep the pace with technological 
development, and adapt our organizations, then, “technology will triumph over us.”13 
In this context, this thesis is especially relevant to the Hungarian Defence Forces 
and to the 2nd SOF Group, as well as any governments of allied countries that undergo 
similar manning challenges and reform attempts.  
This thesis could provide decision-makers at all levels with an overview of the 
challenges, and a roadmap to assist them in reworking their recruitment, SOF selection, 
training, and retention strategy. An effective strategy—based on lessons learned and vise 
foresight preparation—could provide an agenda to support governments, military decision-
 
11 Hungary is the member of the Visegrád Group -or V4- along with Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia. The common goal is to synchronize the economic, diplomatic efforts, along with common 
defense and political interests. 
12 Imre Porkoláb, “Szervezeti Innováció a Magyar Honvédségben: Az Ember-Gép Szimbiózisa a 
Stratégiaelméletek Tükrében,” Haditechnika 53, no. 1 (2019): 2–8, https://doi.org/10.23713/HT.53.1.01. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
5 
makers, and civil societies in their endeavors to assist SOF manning strategies. A revised 
SOF recruiting, assessment, selection, and training strategy could be based on an 
international comparative study, to present the challenges and reaffirm the fact that 
diminishing opportunities require an adaptive and flexible mindset.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis hypothesizes that a complex strategy is required from the HDF and the 
2nd SOF Group aimed at more robust recruitment and retention mechanisms. This strategy 
must include the following:  
∑ Improved recruitment and promotion processes, including research-based 
and targeted recruiting involving the 2nd SOF Group, in parallel with robust 
strategic communications and outreach processes; 
∑ Improved pre-selection procedures organized by the 2nd SOF Group, as well 
as an adaptive selection and Special Operations Basic Course (SOBC) 
system; 
∑ Increased salaries and benefits;  
∑ Improved education and training activities focused on organizational 
culture development. 
E. METHOD OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis seeks to identify possible solutions for the HUN SOF, and in particular 
for the 2nd SOF Group, which, as the force provider, must achieve effective force 
generation. To that end, this research consisted of three parts. The first part provided an 
overview of the role and place of the 2nd SOF Group in the HDF, and a review and analysis 
of the current HDF manning strategy as it relates to the 2nd SOF Group. This part aimed at 
providing an in-depth analysis of the current challenges and catalysts for progress in 
manning the 2nd SOF Group. 
The second part of this research consisted of a survey in the form of a questionnaire 
to assess international counterparts on SOF-related recruitment, assessment, selection, 
6 
training, and retention processes. The survey sought to analyze the potential common 
trends and divergences in the recruitment, selection methods, and training and retention 
strategies of their SOF among various countries.  
 
The questionnaire comprised the following main categories: 
1. As first to locate in general the existence of challenges with manning, and 
retention in the targeted country, even to detect existing fall in the morale for 
varieties of reasons.  
2. In the case of a decreasing applicant tendency and the lack of volunteers, what 
corrective policies and strategies are used?  
3. In the case of reforming the SOF personnel assessment and selection 
procedures, what kind of alterations have been applied? 
4. Were there any significant modifications in the SOF qualification training? 
5. In the case of multiple changes, what has proven to be the most effective for 
efficient force generation? Revised recruiting policies, altered selection 
methods, or the transformed training procedures or steps to ensure more 
efficient retention strategy? 
The third part of this thesis provided a comparative analysis between Hungary’s 
and other countries’ SOF recruitment, assessment, selection, training, and retention process 
development, which formed the basis for recommendations for Hungarian HDF leadership 
vis-à-vis improving the 2nd SOF Group manning strategies and processes. 
There are a few limitations associated with this research. First, while the Hungarian 
Special Operations Forces capability is based significantly on the Special Operations Task 
Units (SOTU), this thesis discussed only the 2nd SOF Group. Second, due to classified 
information regarding official numbers of the active personnel, the thesis is unable to 
7 
provide exact numbers about specific elements within the 2nd SOF Group, such as the size 
of the Task Groups or fluctuation rates. 
The third important limitation caused by the official limitations of the survey. In 
line with my official approval process, the survey was not allowed to ask any kind of 
personal, even more, subjective or predicting opinions from the participants. (Regardless, 
I must emphasize the outstanding support and encouragement of the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s IRB office, which supported me in every way during the preparation of the 
survey.) Thus, the thesis relied only on the facts, which had greatly contributed to 
confirming my assumptions or stressing the effectiveness of a different perspective. 
However, this gap hinders my ability to acquire additional friendly and selfless, often 
helpful extra information.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I provides the introduction and presents the nature of the problem that the 
Hungarian 2nd SOF Group has been facing in recent years because of human resource 
management. 
Chapter II provides a review of the literature related to recruitment, assessment, 
selection, training, and retention (RAST-R) of personnel in Special Operations Forces.  
Chapter III provides an overview of the role and place of the Hungarian 2nd SOF 
Group within the HDF. The chapter presents the current HDF manning strategy and 
processes as they relate to 2nd SOF Group. In the case of the 2nd SOF Group’s involvement 
in the strategic recruitment campaign, this chapter also provides a comprehensive overview 
of opportunities—as well as strategies—and lessons learned from a successful recruitment 
program implemented and executed by the 2nd SOF Group.  
Chapter IV discusses the international survey and its results.  
Chapter V provides a comparative analysis of the 2nd SOF Group’s manning 
strategies and practices with those employed by the surveyed countries. It also provides the 
overall findings of the thesis research and tests the hypotheses put forward in Chapter I. It 
8 
also provides possible recommendations to Hungarian authorities, which they can use to 
improve 2nd SOF Group personnel recruitment and retention.  
9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature related to SOF 
transformation. It includes academic and expert debates surrounding SOF human resource 
management. The literature review consists of two sections. The first section provides an 
analysis of the main academic debates regarding SOF transformation—including both 
global and Hungarian perspectives. The second section covers the main debates in the 
literature on what constitutes effective manning procedures. This section also includes an 
anaysis of the scholarly works dedicated to conceptualizing the profile of the SOF operator. 
A. ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO MAINTAIN THE 
STRATEGIC ROLE OF SOF 
There is general agreement on the necessity of improving SOF development 
internationally. James D. Kiras contributes to the discussion in Special Operations Journal 
in his article “Recruiting and Organizing to Meet Future SOF challenges.” 14 The focus of 
Kiras’s article is a study of personnel attrition due to high demand and high operational 
tempo. Kiras stresses that “the prospect of more lucrative compensation packages has lured 
scarce talent away from military SOF units and towards the corporate world and private 
sector security companies.”15 The concerns of overstretching and disproportionately large 
attrition has brought journalists, authors, and policymakers together to investigate this 
phenomenon. Kiras identifies and highlights the primary concern of SOF operators, namely 
that “the bar is being lowered, in terms of selection standards and criteria, to expand or 
simply maintain the current size of national SOF organizations.”16 This point of view exists 
in the 2nd SOF Group also, and it carries the side effect of permeating the HDF in general 
and potentially diminishing its reputation and image as an organization. 
 
14 James Kiras, Introduction: “Recruiting and Organizing to Mett Future SOF Challenges” 
(SpecialOperations Journal, 5; 1–5, 2019), 2. 
15 James Kiras, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, and Nicolaj Juul Nielsen, “Introduction: Recruiting and 
Organizing to Meet Future SOF Challenges,” Special Operations Journal 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 1–5, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2019.1581423. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
10 
Multiple authors indicate that the current and existing “tasks, force structure, and 
personnel profile”17 might not be self-evident today. The Recruiting and Organizing to 
Meet Future SOF Challenges emphasizes that the complex sphere of specialties and skills 
has to be assessed to find the required “kind” of human talent. The required high level of 
adaptability to technological developments even threatens the core truth that “Humans are 
more important than hardware.”18 Also, the idea of recruiting and integrating females as 
operators to fill the growing gaps is a debate that must be approached carefully. Kiras 
concludes that SOF operators need to be tailored to the mission, and says the “SOF may 
have to reassess long-held beliefs, traditions, and organizing principles to answer the 
question of what will continue to make SOF special?”19  
To be able to define the profile of the required talent requires reassessing the way 
and degree of the inevitable change—in terms how the talent could respond for the 
recruiting . In the same context, LTC Manuel A. Diemer stresses the importance of targeted 
recruiting while also increasing of the pool of possible candidates. “Reducing recruiting 
goals and targeting the recruiting while increasing the pool of eligible is the formula that 
will produce the best results for Special Forces (SF) in the future.”20 This general approach, 
was written in 2001, when the problems of overstretch and operational tempo were not as 
significant as they are today, yet Diemer’s suggestions were prescient. Diemer addresses 
“the theory of the less is better,” which ensures the “smaller size of trainees … leads 
directly to the higher assessor to candidate ratios.”21  
The author’s main goal in this thesis is to suggest a recruiting method whereby the 
pool of possible candidates is increased systematically by targeting “several low-number, 
 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 “USSOCOM,” accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths. 
19 James Kiras, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, and Nicolaj Juul Nielsen, “Introduction: Recruiting and 
Organizing to Meet Future SOF Challenges,” Special Operations Journal 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 1–5, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2019.1581423, 5. 
20 LTC Manuel A. Diemer, USAWC Strategy Research Project: „Manning Special Forces in the 21 
Century: Strategies for Recruiting, Assessing, and Selecting Soldiers for Special Forces Training” (U.S. 
Army War Collage 2001), 2. 
21 Ibid., 11. 
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high-yield, and high-payoff” areas instead of targeting the masses.22 The U.S. Army 
Research Institute identified “29 attributes”23 in 1999, such as physical, cognitive, 
interpersonal, and communication skills, to define not only the SF performance categories, 
but the critical performance attributes24 These profile attributes are crucial to the follow-
on research with the planned survey questionnaire in this thesis. 
Several scholars agree with the neccessity of the modern and adaptive marketing-
driven PR approach. Ronald D. Ficker, Jr, Samual E. Buttery and Jonathan K. Alt express 
practical applications on how the U.S. Armed Services, Australian Defence Force, and the 
Royal Navy exploit the recruiting practices by borrowing from the civilian marketing 
experriences. The future “Navy Recruiting Strategy is to improve and best align Navy 
Recruiting practices for the Millenial and post-Millenial generations.”25 Although the 
targeted population is specific to the naval forces, the method of attracting younger 
generations requires an adaptive PR campaign.  
In her doctoral thesis, Judit Stummer provides a detailed illustration of the current 
labor shortage and recommendations regarding overcoming this challenge. One pillar of 
her thesis is a survey of more than 3,000 students, who were involved in military education, 
in Hungary.26 From her nine-year-long survey, she concludes that, in many cases, the “total 
lack of project-based approach for assignments among many lay in the background, even 
though anomalies generated by the hierarchic structure could be remedied or even 
terminated by the application of the said project-based approach for assignments in many 
cases.”27 She argues that there is a need for a logically consistent project organization. 
 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23“Special Warfare - 06.01.1999,” DVIDS, accessed October 24, 2020, https://www.dvidshub.net/
publication/issues/8278. 
24 Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School, 1998. 
25 Ronald D Fricker, Samuel E Buttrey, and Jonathan K Alt, “Future Navy Recruiting Strategies,” 
n.d., 242. 
26 Judit Stummer, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állománya utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a 
köz- és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében,” n.d., 180. 
27 Judit Stummer, “A Magyar Honvédség Személyi állománya utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a 
köz- és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében” (PhD Diss, Gödöllő, 2019), 132. 
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Stummer indicates, that it is vital to create conditions to manage the (in most cases 
separately existing) tasks in a coherent way. Establishing an innovative “project portfolio” 
team to eliminate the inherent risks of hasty decisions, supported by a consistent marketing 
and PR concept, could be a key task. Stummer proved in her study that a single website 
cannot achieve the attention of the possible demographic layer of the population; moreover, 
it lacks the advantage of the speed and independency of spreading social media platforms 
provide.  
In the same vein, Petar Georgiev Vlahov introduces the targeted recruiting process 
as a “pre-selection”28 step in recruitment—i.e., screening the volunteer’s profile using 
social media. In his view, a revised “pre-selection” should carefully screen and assess all 
the physical and mental and mature readiness, to improve selection by reducing the number 
of candidates with only slight chances.29 Dr. Imre Porkoláb, in the Szervezeti innováció a 
Magyar Honvédségben: az ember-gép szimbiózisa a stertégia elméletek tükrében 
(Organizational Innovation in the Hungarian Defence Forces: Symbiosis of the human and 
machine in the Light of Strategic Theories), agrees, arguing that it is essential for HDF to 
successfully manage the challenge of organizational change resulting from digital 
transformation.30 Dr. Porkoláb indicates that the role of attitudinal change is gaining 
importance these days, and it can be observed that the “large bureaucratic organizations, 
almost without exception, strive to use faster decision-making processes, more adaptive 
and flexible organizational forms, and more efficient methods of capacity building.”31  
Other scholars agree. In the A hivatástudat és technológiai fejlődés a Magyar 
Honvédségben (Calling to professionalism and Technological Development in the 
 
28 Petar Georgiev Vlahov, “Assessment and Selection Process for the Bulgarian Special Forces,”MSc 
Thesis, Defense Analysis Depaertment, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2019. n.d., 126.  
29 Ibid., 63. 
30 Porkoláb Imre, “Szervezeti innováció a Magyar Honvédségben: az ember-gép szimbiózisa a 
stratégiaelméletek tükrében,” Haditechnika 53, no. 1 (2019): 2–8, https://doi.org/10.23713/HT.53.1.01, 2. 
31 Ibid., 2. 
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Hungarian Armed Forces),32 Tibor Benkő examines the relationship between the human 
resources and attitude of call for professionalism. He agrees with the view that today’s 
accelerated world order modifies or alters traditional human values in many ways. With 
regard to the HDF, he contrasts soldiers in the profession and contract service soldiers, and 
derives motivational differences from both aspects. Benkő emphasizes the need for 
ongoing development of organizational culture, working conditions, and the relationships 
between leaders and subordinates. Benkő raises the importance of the civil-military 
relationship, especially since the abolition of the conscript service. Society now has only 
meager insight into the HDF. As a result, “society largely shapes its opinion through the 
media.”33 The hazards of this as an effect—such as harmful disinformation—as well as its 
benefits as promotion are repeatedly substantiated by the author.  
Lt. Col. Attila Ambrus in the A Generációs Kihívások Kezelése a Magyar 
Honvédségben (Managing Generational Challenges in the Hungarian Defence Forces) 
outlines the factors which currently affect the HDF in terms of different generational needs 
and profiles. He highlights the current unfavorable demographic situation and the 
considerable reasons for the exit rate within the HDF. As of 2020, the composition of the 
HDF can be thought of as four generations: “baby boomers, X, Y and Z.”34 Within these 
groups, generations “X” and “Y” are the most common demographic layers regarding 
active service simply due to the current service and pension possibilities. However, the “Z” 
generation is of particular importance, since it represents the majority of enlisted soldiers. 
Based on a report reflecting the composition of the HDF in 2016, the enlisted category 
represented 31% of the entire HDF, significantly composed by the “Z” generation.35  
Figure 1 presents the current age composition of the HDF, highlighting generations 
“X,” “Y” and “Z.” Ambrus argues that the different generational groups have different 
 
32 Benkő Tibor, “Hivatástudat és Technológiai Fejlődés a Magyar Honvédségben” Professionalism 
and Technological Development in the Hungarian Armed Forces (Hadtudomány/Különszám, 2016), 10. 
33 Benkő Tibor, “Hivatástudat és Technológiai Fejlődés a Magyar Honvédségben” Professionalism 
and Technological Development in the Hungarian Armed Forces (Hadtudomány/Különszám, 2016), 10. 
34 Ambrus Péter, “Generációs kihívások kezelése a Magyar Honvédségben,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, 
no. 4 (July 24, 2020): 108–20, https://doi.org/10.35926/HSZ.2020.4.8, 109. 
35  A Honvédség katona állománya, “Adatok a Magyar Honvédségről,” n.d., 2. 
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workplace expectations and habits. He emphasizes that determining the motivation of a 
given generation is a key factor to achieving feasible long-term recruitment and retention 
strategies. Ambrus indicates that the solution requires “outside of the box” thinking to 
avoid biased generation theory schemes and to build an effective employer brand for the 
HDF. Ambrus states that the HDF must accept the fact that value and motivation to the 
“X” generation can have a completely different meaning to the “Y” or the “Z” generation. 
 
Figure 1. The age composition of the HDF, based on the assessment on 15. 
January 2020.36 
 
36 Ambrus Péter, “Generációs kihívások kezelése a Magyar Honvédségben,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, 
no. 4 (July 24, 2020): 108–20, https://doi.org/10.35926/HSZ.2020.4.8, 110. 
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Ambrus suggests that winning the younger generations’ attention by maintaining 
an alluring organizational culture can be the key to developing an effective recruitment 
strategy and manning policy. The employer brand forms an essential part of the 
organizational culture, but “building and maintaining an employer-brand in the HDF 
should be treated as a much more complex process.”37 Pákozdi and Torba agree that the 
organizational culture, social responsibility, daily routine of the employees and the work 
atmosphere must reflect professionalism in a complex whole. Although organizational 
culture is an amorphous concept, Peter Drucker highlights its undeniable importance with 
a remarkable metaphor: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.”38 The study from the Deloitte 
Center for Government—SOF culture is the mission, culture is the key to special operations 
transition to great power competition—concludes that organizational culture consists of 
varieties of tangible and intangible elements, from the simple daily routine moments such 
as conversations, grooming standards, and behavior during training events, up to the 
physical artifacts such as workspace conditions. “Organizational culture is created and 
maintained by the constant interaction between those tangible artifacts, the group’s 
behaviors, and the behaviors and beliefs of each individual.”39 The Deloitte report 
indicates that the organizational culture is the vital element to any successful 
transformation; “when the mission shift, culture also often must shift.”40 
Benkő agrees with the changing environment and highlights its importance in 
Hivatástudat és Technológiai Fejlődés a Magyar Honvédségben (Calling to 
professionalism and Technological Development in the Hungarian Armed Forces). He 
states that the leadership of the Hungarian Defence Forces must adapt to the requirements 
of the age, including the current labor market conditions. He agrees that “the salary, 
promotion, and social welfare system must be developed and maintained that can be 
 
37 Pákozdi Márta and Torba Attila, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állományának 
motivációhierarchiája,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, no. 2 (March 12, 2020), https://doi.org/10.35926/
HSZ.2020.2.5. 





managed flexibly and be able to adapt to rapid changes in society.”41 These needs are 
influenced by generational differences associated with cultural and different life stages, as 
well as differences in social background and values. The difference appears not in their 
existence, but in their order of precedence. The cornerstone of motivational research, 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs pyramid, is suitable for measuring the motivations of military 
employees in the HDF. 
A significant study summarizes the changes in the motivational hierarchy and the 
causes behind these changes. LtCol. Márta Pákozdi and LtCol Attila Torba investigate the 
cause behind the restructured hierarchy and the five-tier system of the Maslow Pyramid. 
The authors argue the A Magyar Honvédség Személyi Állományának 
Motivációhierarchiája (Motivation Hierarchy of the Personnel of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces) that the HDF’s aim must be to establish an organizational culture that motivates 
the individual for productive and satisfying work; as such, the organization gains profit 
through efficient and satisfying labor. Both authors suggest that the Maslow’s personal 
motivational pyramid “needs to be reinterpreted.”42 In both authors’ interpretation, a new 
tier appears at the bottom of the revised Maslow pyramid: the information environment, 
which includes the internet (see Figure 2). Pákozdi and Torba further point out that the 
environment where the potential new recruits live has changed, so the system and hierarchy 
of needs must change as well. One peculiarity of change is that the individual may progress 
more quickly towards self-actualization, often ignoring or misjudging the importance of 
basic needs. In terms of self-actualization, virtual means of self-expression (blogs, Twitter) 
appear with the twist that an individual becomes satisfied when he or she can “convey his 
or her satisfaction to a virtual audience.”43 The fact that today’s community need is 
 
41 Pákozdi Márta and Torba Attila, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állományának 
motivációhierarchiája,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, no. 2 (March 12, 2020), https://doi.org/10.35926/
HSZ.2020.2.5, 7. 
42 Pákozdi Márta and Torba Attila, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állományának 
motivációhierarchiája,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, no. 2 (March 12, 2020), https://doi.org/10.35926/
HSZ.2020.2.5, 38. 
43 Jared Bilski, “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Revised for Modern Civilization,” McSweeney’s 
Internet Tendency, accessed October 24, 2020, https://www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/maslows-hierarchy-
of-needs-revised-for-modern-civilization. 
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suppressed by the individual need for self-actualization complicates the idea of collective 
cause, and therefore the HDF’s recruitment issues. In the interpretation of Pákozdi and 
Torba, the Maslow pyramid model presents still a substantive tier of the hierarchies of 
demand, even in the fourth industrial revolution. “Its reinterpretation does not change its 
essence, but the addition is recommended due to the rapidly evolving information 
environment.”44  
 
Figure 2. Reinterpretation of the hierarchy of needs. Source: Pákozdi and 
Torba (2020).45 
In sum, Pákozdi and Torba indicate that in their interpretation, the Internet, as a 
need for the flow of information, can provide security for individuals through the resources 
it offers, such as communication, orientation, and the awareness that the person is a part of 
something larger than himself.  
 
44 Pákozdi Márta and Torba Attila, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állományának 
motivációhierarchiája,” Honvédségi Szemle 148, no. 2 (March 12, 2020), https://doi.org/10.35926/
HSZ.2020.2.5, 42. 
45 Ibid., 42. 
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B. ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOF OPERATOR 
The modern literature pertaining to the characteristics of the ideal SOF operator is 
limited. Multiple authors highlight that physical capability is given more weight than 
mental hardiness and interpersonal abilities. Benjamin Ordiway points out the obvious 
need for moral foundations in SOF operators. He argues that selection generally focuses 
on physical and cognitive values. “What goes unmeasured, at least formally, is an 
aspirant’s moral and adult development.”46 He refers to ethical values, which reinforce that 
organizational bond and discipline are key factors for a successful educational process in 
the SOF.  
Michael Mourouzis in his thesis investigating the way of successful assessment, 
suggests that four factors are essential in a candidate’s becoming an SOF operator. His 
research narrows down the spectrum of SOF to the field of unconventional warfare (UW), 
which is one core task for SOF, and a capability Hungary has been developing since 2005. 
Mourouzis identifies “motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and 
adaptability.”47 He also indicates “that the primary predictor of success is the APFT48 
score.”49 The author draws his analysis from his own experiences as an SF recruiter for 18 
months. He uses many examples to describe the situation where in which the number of 
soldiers shrinks, and offers multiple explanatory factors in terms of attributes common to 
younger recruits. He emphasizes the importance of reorganizing and building up a “referral 
program, accurate advertising, long- term engagement strategy, and renewed leader 
involvement, targeted recruitment”50 to achieve a better link to society and thus to the 
 
46 Candace L. Upton, “Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate,” The Journal 
of Ethics 13, no. 2–3 (September 2009): 103–15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9054-2.” (Small Wars 
Journal, 02.07.2020). https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fixing-problem-integrating-virtue-ethics-us-
special-operations-forces-selection-education 
47 Michael G. Mourouzis, “Finding Lawrence: Recruiting Talent for Unconventional Warfare,” MSc 
Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011), v.  
48 (APFT) Army Physical Fitness Test. 
49: Michael G. Mourouzis, “Finding Lawrence: Recruiting Talent for Unconventional Warfare,” MSc 
Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011), 66. 
50 Ibid., 66. 
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potential pool of candidates. He also argues that nowadays, in order to keep pace with the 
rapidly evolving modern world, a revised method of communication is essential. 
Traditional methods, such as face-to-face conversation, contacting, and limited travel 
options for recruiters leave many opportunities untapped.  
Interestingly, George F. McGrath describes a methodology similar to the one being 
used by the HDF. The four main prospecting strategies to recruit USSF volunteers are the 
flexible mixture of “telephone, referral, face-to-face, and internet or email prospecting.”51 
In his view, e-mail prospecting is the least useful tool, while face-to-face meetings52 are 
key in gaining and keeping the attention of potential volunteers. The importance of human 
persuasion cannot be neglected, and should be used with other tools in the modern complex 
recruiting environment, as McGrath presented. At the same time, the human factor must 
be integrated strategically into the system of recruitment tools. McGrath ranked the above-
mentioned strategies in 2007. Over the last 13 years, the available options for 
communication and the trends of using different technologies to communicate have 
increased in an explosive way. Beth J. Ash argues that social media plays a key role in this 
system.  
In sum, human interaction is still a powerful factor in convincing people and in 
recruiting, but it must be integrated into the toolbox of advertising and communicating. 
The internet, websites, social media, printed publications, and even small-scale distributed 
product-based strategy exist within the context of human interaction. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The relevance of the SOF remains unquestioned, a fact that is emphasized in the 
literature review. The SOF represents a strategic capability in the decision makers’ toolset, 
to achieve high payoff goals, in a modern environment where conventional forces cannot 
operate or can operate only to a limited extent. In the 21st century, security challenges have 
 
51 George F. McGrath, “Email Marketing for U.S. Army and Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Recruiting,” MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California: 
Naval Postgraduate School,2007), 5.  
52 Ibid., 52. 
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become more and more complex; developments such as the grey zone, hybrid warfare, and 
increasing terrorism reaffirm the need for ongoing SOF development. In the modern 
environment, the skills of adaptivity and flexibility are crucial; they must come from the 
military organization, but also from the individual. Therefore, in most sources the 
importance of the human factor, the SOF operators, is highlighted. 
These academic debates reveal the significance of the human factor even in a time 
of accelerated digitization. An analysis of the Hungarian literature makes it clear that a 
transformation of the system of social needs is emerging. This transformation in the 
hierarchy of social needs affects the HDF, and thereby the 2nd SOF Group’s manning 
possibilities. The existing literature reveals that the current-day employee—and any 
potential workforce—relates differently to the employer and to the workplace. Due to this 
altered relationship, the HDF must consciously and proactively think of itself as an 
employer with a brand. The literature indicates the importance of organizational culture, 
and suggests that the HDF must adapt to compete with Human Resources departments in 
parallel with the ongoing defense industry development.  
The literature suggests that the challenge for the HDF is twofold. The military 
capability has to evolve with changing threats, while, at the same time, the HDF must find 
and recruit suitable personnel into its organizations. This is an even more complex 
challenge in terms of the nature of SOF. The capabilities and commitment required of a 
SOF operator are far more complex, and the expectations far higher, than they are for 
conventional forces. While the sources indicated approaches the 2nd SOF Group can take 
to expand its role by assisting with effective recruitment, it also reaffirms that the 2nd SOF 
Group must adapt to the environment if the number of volunteers is decreasing, in order to 







III. BACKGROUND OF THE HUNGARIAN 2ND SOF GROUP: 
ORGANIZATION AND MANNING  
Since the mid-2000s, to effectively combat the multifarious challenges of the 
current regional and global security context, the Hungarian political and military leadership 
has striven to develop special operational capabilities within HDF.53 The 2nd SOF Group, 
established in 2017, is the component largest in size, and most valuable in terms of fighting 
capability, in the overall Hungarian SOF. This chapter provides an overview of the role 
and place of the Hungarian 2nd SOF Group and SOF operators—the essential components 
of the overall SOF mission—in the HDF. It also provides a review and analysis of the 2nd 
SOF Group’s personnel selection process. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2nd SOF GROUP 
Recent regional and global security trends and hybrid warfare developments have 
increasingly been calling for high-readiness, state-of-the-art military forces equipped with 
modern armaments, capable of operating under unified command and control, yet also able 
to carry out tasks to a limited extent with conventional military elements. To that end, at 
the direction of the Hungarian government, the HDF created the 2nd Special Operations 
Regiment on 01 September 2017.54 In terms of capability; SOF are military units, able to 
operate effectively in small units, in extreme climatic environments, under high physical 
and psychological pressure, with the tradecraft of conventional and unconventional 
problem-solving to achieve high-payoff objectives.  
 
53 Special operations involve “Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, 
selected, trained, and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment.” 
Madeleine Moon, “NATO Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment,” 169 DSCFC 
18 E rev.1 fin | Original: English |18 November 2018, (Defence and Security Council (DSC) Sub-
Committee on Future Security and Defence Capability (DSCFC), 2018.), 4. 
54 The brigade became FOC on 28 February 2018. 37/2017, (VII.24) HDF Comission, A Magyar 
Honvédség különleges rendeltetésű dandár képesség kialakításával kapcsolatos egyes feladatokról, 





The structure of the 2nd SOF Group is similar to the structure of any other Hungarian 
military brigade organization—commanding element, combat elements, combat support 
elements, combat service support elements—with one exception. The components of the 
brigade (including all of the combat elements) are not organized into battalions but into 
Task Groups (TGs): two Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) and two Rohamlövész 
Task Groups (RTG).55 This unique TG structure allowed the brigade to maintain the same 
staff capabilities that a conventional battalion does although smaller in size.56 Similarly to 
U.S. Ranger battalions, the RTGs are airborne, or air-mobile capable, fast-deployable 
combat elements, built for direct action and special reconnaissance. The RTG’s combat 
elements are divided into platoon formations—Rohamlövész Task Units (RTU)—to 
achieve flexible maneuver and firepower capacity. In contrast, the SOTGs, regarding the 
main combat elements, are composed of the Special Operations Task Units (SOTU), which 
is the “lowest level of a SOF tactical level combat element that deploys by air, land, or sea 
and is able to conduct SR, DA, or MA.”57  
The SOTUs are twelve-man operator teams, highly similar to the U.S. Operational 
Detachment Alpha (U.S. ODA). In addition to direct action and special reconnaissance 
operations, SOTGs and the subordinate SOTUs are fully trained to plan, lead, and execute 
military assistance (MA) and non-conventional operations. The Hungarian SOF capability 
is highly reliant on the Special Operations Task Units (SOTU) of the 2nd SOF Group.58 
From the CS and CSS aspect, the 2nd SOF Group is structured to maintain the previously 
highlighted flexibility and mobility. Besides the brigade’s commanding element, one 
 
55 The RTGs are officially named as Rohamlövész Task Groups. The name can be derived back to the 
Rohamlövész course, - the Special Combat Infantry Course- which was the most challenging ranger type, 
light infantry and air assault course in the HDF between 2003 and 2013. 
56 Thus, the TG leadership manages a smaller size force—e.g., four quickly deployable, self-sufficient 
combat TGs.  
57 Tajti Norbert, “Enhancing Hungarian Special Forces Through Transformation—The Shift to 
Special Operations Forces” MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School 
(Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 2  
58 As a matter of course, the SOTGs do not embody the full range of special operations capability. 
During the preparation of the mission, either the execution, external enablers from the HDF can be attached 
and utilized as force multiplier capabilities. For instance; Civil-Military, and Psychological Operations 
Teams, (CIMIC-PSYOPS) Explosive Ordenance Disposal (EOD) teams, and Chemical Biological 
Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) teams from the HDF. 
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Combat Support Task Group (CSTG), one Logistical Company (Log Coy), and the 
Training Company (Training Coy) are responsible to support the SOTGs or RTGs 
missions.59 This innovative structure has several benefits; all task group-sized elements 
are structured to operate a staff, likely to size and function as conventional battalions do.60 
This structure in turn allows the subordinate fighting elements in the TGs to operate with 
the support of their organic commanding, CS, and CSS elements, to maintain efficient self-
sufficiency.61  
The 2nd SOF Group’s unique organizational design allows it to perform a full 
spectrum of special operations tasks, using land, air, and waterborne insertion methods as 
well as light infantry—ranger type—tasks, combining them as needed. Mission execution 
is characterized by a high degree of self-determination and precision. The 2nd SOF Group’s 
main responsibilities, which derive from the memorandum of founding, signed by the 
Minister of Defense, include the following tasks: 
The protection of Hungary’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and borders, by 
military force, executing joint defense and peacekeeping tasks arising from international 
treaties, and the activities of humanitarian action in accordance with the rules of 
international law. Execution of special operation tasks and related activities are defined in 
NATO doctrines under national authority, or rather participation in them within the 
alliance; participation in tasks undertaken in peace operations; participation in peacetime 
and war in search and rescue operations. Participation in crisis management is defined in 
separate plans.62 
 
59 The Training Coy, for example, is designated to plan, organize, and execute training events, such as 
the Special Operations  Assessment and Selection (SOAS) and the ensuing Special Operations Basic 
Course (SOBC). Due to its high level of workload, the SOAS are often dedicated tasks for the SOTGs. 
60 In terms of the functions, the staff covers the roles from S1 to S7, organized into operational center, 
support center and signal center. 
61 In case of the SOTGs, organically Joint Terminal Attack Controller Team, Sinper Team, and Intel 
Support Team and an Infantry Platoon can be found as CS elements. From the CSS aspect, all SOTGs 
includes a Logistics Platoon, and Signal Squad. 
62 “MH 2. vitéz Bertalan Árpád Különleges Rendeltetésű Dandár,” July 31, 2020, 
https://honvedelem.hu/alakulat/mh-2-vitez-bertalan-arpad-kulonleges-rendeltetesu-dandar.html.  
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More specifically, the 2nd SOF Group’s main roles include the following: 
conducting special operational activities—including special reconnaissance (SR), direct 
action (DA), and military assistance (MA)—as directed by Hungarian or/and NATO 
authorities; participating in peacekeeping operations; carrying out military operations 
aimed at safeguarding Hungary’s homeland security, in line with NATO treaties; 
conducing joint military operations with the rest of the Hungarian Defence Force’s 
branches (land or air force, for example) to respond to unexpected security threats requiring 
military force; carrying out additional special missions that either are too difficult, or 
cannot be, combated by conventional forces; conducting combat search and rescue 
operations; and participating, upon request, in military police tasks.63  
These roles and responsibilities are in line with the NATO Special Operations 
Forces, as defined by NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, such as the 
Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Military Assistance (MA). 
Essentially, the SOF’s main role is to support NATO and national operational and strategic 
goals. A common feature of these tasks is the correlation of high-risk, and the high-pay-off 
employment concept. In this context, indicating Hungary’s NATO membership-related 
collective defense and security responsibilities, the Hungarian Special Operations Task 
Units combined with commanding elements and support attachments were deployed 
continuously in operational theatres. The Hungarian contingents executed rotations in 
Central Afghanistan (2009-2012), and Eastern Afghanistan (2012-2014), under the 
mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and, since 2014 to the time 
of this writing, in the northern region of Afghanistan under the mandate of the Resolute 
Support Mission (RS-M).64 In addition, SOTUs have conducted advisory and training 
deployments in Northern Iraq. Since 2016 Hungarian SOTUs and members of combat 
support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements have been deployed under the 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Beszámoló, az afganisztáni Nemzetközi Biztonsági Közreműködő Erők (ISAF) műveleteiben 
történő magyar katonai szerepvállalásról szóló 21/2008. (XII.29) Korm. Határozat módosításáról 
(Government of Hungary 2013. December), 2–3. https://www.parlament.hu/irom40/00050/00050.pdf  
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Kurdistan Training and Coordination Center (KTCC) to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) within the Hungarian contingent.65  
All in all, Special Operations Forces consist of selected and highly trained soldiers 
who are individuals with unconventional mindset.66 Norbert Tajti in Enhancing Hungarian 
Special Forces through Transformation—The Shift to Special Operations Forces argues 
that special forces operators must achieve success when the stakes are very high, which in 
turn requires unconventional thinking, which is not something readily found in the military 
standard operations manual.67 To that end, recruitment in SOF must ensure that the best 
and brightest enlisted, non-commissioned officers, and officers join the special operations 
forces. This endeavor is exactly what Hungary’s SOF has striven to do since the creation 
of its first SF battalion in 2005, and has continued to accomplish after the establishment of 
the 2nd SOF Group in 2017.  
B. THE 2ND SOF GROUP’S PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT, ASSESSMENT 
AND SELECTION PROCEDURE 
The 2nd SOF Group has limited authority to operate its independent self-serving 
civilian-focused recruitment system, so the brigade is highly dependent on the HDF’s 
recruiting campaign, since the end of conscription in 2004.68 The HDF’s recruitment 
strategy involves both direct—in person—and virtual staffing endeavors. The recruitment 
specifically for the SOAS in terms of the 2nd SOF Group occurs externally and internally, 
 
65 Wagner Péter, „Magyar részvétel az Iszlám Állam Elleni harcban: Kiképzési Feladatok Iraki 
Kurdisztánban” Hungarian Participation to Fight ISIS: Training Missions in Iraqi Kurdistan (Antal József 
Tudásközpont, AJRC-Elemzések, 2016), 7. 
66 Tajti Norbert, “Enhancing Hungarian Special Forces Through Transformation—The Shift to 
Special Operations Forces” MSc Thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School 
(Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 23. 
67 Tajti gives a brilliant definition about the unconventional thinking; “…not taking anything by face 
value and seeking out the intention of the rules rather than blindly apply them, and occasionally even 
questioning authority. Thinking unconventionally means seeing around the corner where other people see 
walls and being innovative and adaptive as the rule and not the exception, while remaining moral or, at 
worst, amoral, but never immoral.” p. 22-23. 
68 “Honvédségi Szemle, 2009 Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár,” accessed October 28, 2020, 
https://adtplus.arcanum.hu/hu/view/HonvedsegiSzemle_2009/, 34. The 2nd SOF Group often participates 
in official promotional activities between the brigade and other military organizations of the HDF, also in 
advertising activities specifically toward the civil society. 
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from the existing Hungarian armed forces personnel, through announcing the official 
requirements through the HDF’s official lines of communication.69 To perform 
comprehensive recruitment tasks, the HDF operates a military recruitment system 
involving a number of organizational elements, from the level of recruiting offices to the 
leading element in the MoD, which will be discussed next.  
1. External Recruitment: The HDF’s Recruitment System 
The HDF’s and MoD’s toolset provides information on the internet through web 
pages, which contain—mostly only the required—official information and steps to those 
who are interested in joining the service.70 These endeavors have particularly targeted 
today’s younger generation—potentially the layer that could be the SOF operator of the 
future—which is technology-savvy and “expects to access any information, anytime, 
anywhere, and on any device.”71 As such, HDF’s recruitment websites are high-quality, 
allowing instant access to social media, while the technical staff develops the quality of the 
interactive messages.  
These changes have boosted HDF’s recruitment capabilities. Availability on 
Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and other social media platforms has enabled the HDF to 
make information accessible to the general public quickly and cost effectively.72 As 
followers of a platform grow, so does the likelihood that carefully crafted messages will 
reach the target audience. The self-generating recruiting effect of social media is also a 
 
69 The upcoming selections are advertised on the HDF’s website(s) and their linked social media, and 
through email to all the HDF’s subordinate elements. Through the web-site the sign-up sheet, mandatory 
equipment list and description are available. “Kiválasztó - idén utoljára,” November 3, 2020, 
https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/kivalaszto-iden-utoljara.html.  
70 Before 2015, the webpages and other social media platforms were often outdated or included 
partially inaccurate information. As a corrective, since 2015 the HDF with the directives of the MoD 
implemented significant changes and developments to increase the quality and the content of the media-
based public information and advertising. Judit Stummer, “a magyar honvédség személyi állománya 
utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a köz- és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében,” n.d., 180, 56,59,61,152. 
71 John Sano, “The Changing Shape of HUMINT,” 2015, 4. In particular the „Y” as so called global 
generation, and the „Z” so called digital generation.  
72 “Irány a Sereg! - A Magyar Honvédség Karrieroldala,” accessed November 3, 2020, 
https://www.iranyasereg.hu/. To protect the 2nd Group’s operational security, the 2nd SOF Group’s virtual 
presence has involved content screening, including for example, the identity of the operators, or even the 
listing of sensitive technical equipment. 
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significant positive adjunct as followers continue to share content with other followers.73 
This cost-effective method can support the feedback loop to the HDF about the worthwhile 
types of media products. The HDF 25th Klapka György Lövészdandár’s (Klapka György 
Infantry Brigade) website provides a good example of official information presented in a 
modern, interactive way.74 The directly accessible social media links enable the interested 
individual to easily join and follow events.75 Consequently, social media stands far apart 
from mere web page advertising and plays an importance role in recruitment for the HDF.  
Notwithstanding these developments, intensive virtual presence alone is not enough 
for effective recruitment; real-world, face-to-face personal contact by trained and selected 
professionals remains essential. The HDF’s recruitment office system—by regional 
distribution—is intended to cover the entire country to provide physical access for 
prospective personnel.76 These stationary offices are invaluable for individuals who are 
determined to join or who have specific questions regarding the service before joining. One 
initiative in the recruitment office system is the opening of a temporary recruitment office 
on the University of Eötvös Lóránd campus—in the capital city of Budapest. Besides 
providing an opportunity for civilians to initiate steps to join the military, it also seeks to 
address and inform university students about active and reserve service opportunities after 
their studies.77 The focus group is based on the assumed college dropouts or students with 
a degree who might be looking for a different job, that can provide more excitement for 
certain years if signing up with a contract. 
 
73 Zina Bacha, “Social Media Impact on The Recruitment Process Today,” Strammer (blog), February 
21, 2019, https://strammer.com/en/social-media-impact/. 
74 “MH 25. Klapka György Lövészdandár,” accessed October 28, 2020, https://tataidandar.hu/. 
75 The previously mentioned online presence related limitations regarding the 2nd SOF Group do not 
prohibit website promotion, however, the brigade’s web-site is out of service for a long period, due to 
maintenance issues, therefore the dissemination of the official information and the advertisement is less 
effective. 
76 Currently, in 19 counties with 22 Recruiting offices and one mobile recruiting office. 
77 “Egyetemistákat Toboroz a Honvédség, Már Be Is Lehet Lépni a Seregbe Az ELTE-n | 168 Óra,” 
accessed October 28, 2020, https://168ora.hu/itthon/egyetemistakat-fog-toborozni-a-honvedseg-mar-be-is-
lehet-lepni-a-seregbe-az-elte-n-185661. 
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Military education programs aim to extend the pool of potential future HDF 
recruits. The National Defense Education Program (NDEP) in particular—although not as 
an organic part of the recruitment strategy—is a key tool to reach the younger generation. 
This program aims to strengthen patriotism through education and tutoring. The goal is to 
do more than simply train; it is to establish a bond and build respect for their homeland, 
and guide them through education and example.78 The aim of the NDEP, which indirectly 
supports military recruitment, is to increase the social recognition of the HDF and to 
promote subjects that develop defense and military knowledge through the official 
education system.79 As part of the HDF’s human resources development, the aim is to 
expand the NDEP nationwide, starting with the upper grades of elementary schools, to 
establish military high schools with dormitories,80 and to offer elective classes for higher 
education students81 Positive early education contributes to a willingness to serve in the 
military later. The knowledge gained, as well as the continuously available interaction and 
community, helps an individual to feel less insecure in an accelerating information 
environment and in a world of globalization. The NDEP supports the long-term and 
indirect strategy in case of the 2nd SOF Group’s manning options. Based on the targeted 
audience—such as high school and higher education students—the NDEP does not 
contribute to the short-term manning strategy, but the program reshapes the divide between 
the society and the HDF. The intent, that the HDF keeps its finger on the pulse of younger 
generations, measures the student’s willingness and attitude toward military service and 
supports the provisions for the recruitment strategy, and as a side effect, enlarges the pool 
of possible volunteers. Judit Stummer proved in her empirical research in the A Magyar 
Honvédség Személyi állománya utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a köz- és 
 
78 “Értékszűrővel kell felvértezni a diákokat,” Magyar Nemzet (blog), accessed October 28, 2020, 
https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/ertekszurovel-kell-felvertezni-a-diakokat-7727381/. 
79 “Hazafias nevelés és honvédelem,” September 22, 2020, https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazafias-
neveles-es-honvedelem.html. 
80 “A Honvédelmi Nevelés Pedagógiai Oldala | Pedagógiai Folyóiratok,” accessed October 28, 2020, 
https://folyoiratok.oh.gov.hu/educatio/a-honvedelmi-neveles-pedagogiai-oldala. 
81 Currently the Program contain an effective cooperation with 10 vocational institutions, and 68 
schools in Hungary where the students can choose the subject of basic-level national defense also for the 
matriculation. 
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felsőoktatásban tanulók körében (Opportunities for the Provisions in the Personnel 
Recruitment of the Hungarian Defence Forces between the high school and higher 
education students) that the entry rate of new volunteers does not grow demonstrably due 
to NDEP only; the HDF’s reputation and its acceptance by civilian society is more likely 
to have caused an increase.82 In summary, these programs have been able to directly 
address mainly the “Y” and “Z” generations, promoting various options for active or 
reserve service along with educational opportunities, such as the NCO Academy or the 
University of Public Services. 
Certainly, the indirect recruiting effect of the message aimed at generations Y and 
Z—that of raising interest, which can reach family members and a narrow circle of 
acquaintances—cannot be disregarded. To reach a wider sphere of generations along with 
the targeted youngsters, NDEP initiated the so-called military camps, which have proven 
to be a success in multiple ways.83 Besides the primary intent, to promote the HDF as the 
military service as an option for future generations, parents come into closer contact with 
the soldiers and military organizations to whom their children are entrusted. Dialogue 
between them and insight into everyday military life helps adults to consider the service as 
well as to spread the message.  
The NDEP is the cornerstone of a long-term manning concept, and, for this reason, 
the MoD and HDF decided in 2017 to launch a recruitment program aimed exclusively at 
adult population. The 2nd SOF Group planned, organized and executed the concept, aimed 
at motivating a wider range of generations to join the HDF in the form of active or reserve 
service. The already positive perception of special operations forces, based on the 
extraordinary training and missions executed by the 2nd SOF Group, was reinforced by the 
display of modern equipment, provided a great chance to publicly advertise the event, and 
enlarge the pool of recruits. 
 
82 Judit Stummer, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állománya utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a 
köz- és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében,” n.d., 180. p. 104. 
83 Military camps are conducted in almost every garrison in the country in the summer, thus, 
variations such as Air Force, Engineer, Survivor, Diver, etc., camp allow for a high degree of interest and 
participation. One specific event will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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2. Internal Recruitment 
Despite these public outreach efforts, the Special Operations Task Groups depend 
heavily on internal manning policies and processes. Of the two legal predecessors of the 
2nd SOF Group, the 88th Light Infantry Battalion—in which the combat elements were 
transformed into RTGs84—can be considered as the most likely source with the potential 
to meet the challenge of manning internally. The organizational interaction was mutually 
beneficial, and the integration allowed the newly created brigade to bypass many 
administratively inhibitory factors.85 This organizational fusion in fact enabled the newly 
formed brigade to target and recruit trained and motivated RTG infantry soldiers into the 
Special Operations Task Groups. However, this organizational integration did not entirely 
improve the career path for operators, and SOF enablers in the 2nd SOF Group; hence, 
acquiring candidates with years of experience and infantry skills from the RTGs declined 
rapidly after a promising start. 
Under optimal conditions, followed by the success of HDF recruitment, new 
soldiers are assigned first to one of the 2nd SOF Group’s RTGs in infantry positions or 
perhaps to a CS element. The newly assigned enlisted soldiers or NCOs, even 2nd 
lieutenants, spend just enough time to gain practice and experience in techniques and 
procedures of the light infantry profession.86 Of these personnel, those RTG soldiers who 
are highly motivated and decide to specialize more deeply in SOF, apply for the SOAS and 




84 The Rohamlövész Task Units are dedicated to fulfill the complex role of an airborne and air-mobile, 
light infantry force. They are capable to execute direct action and special reconnassaince missions, but as 
highly prioritized; to support the SOTG’s missions.  
85 Within the 2nd SOF Group, reassignment processes and career opportunities have become simpler 
and less bureaucratic. 
86 They participate in national and multinational exercises, trainings, and overseas deployments—for 
up to 2 or 3 years. 
87 Consequently, manning the RTGs is a high-priority demand for the 2nd SOF Group. 
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This selection process—which allows any soldier from the HDF to apply88—
consists multiple specific tasks in a form of an exercise, aimed to target individuals most 
likely to possess the mental and physical abilities required to begin the SOBC. On average, 
only 20–30% of candidates successfully complete the selection process. Of those who fail 
to complete the process, 90% withdraw voluntarily, and 60% of these individuals withdraw 
in the first 72 hours.89  
The selection’s exclusive focus is to find volunteers with the potential to fulfill the 
role of the SOF operators only. At this point—in contrast with the U.S. SOF for example—
the 2nd SOF Group does not have distinguished selection specially for the combat support 
elements.90 Between 2018 and 2020, for example, four selections were organized by the 
2nd SOF Group, and the majority of applicants came from the 2nd SOF Group’s RTGs. 
Applicants from elements from outside the 2nd SOF Group’s RTGs represent the whole 
spectrum of the HDF, but mostly the other combat, combat support (CS), and combat 
service support (CSS) units. 
The selection process—which emulates the U.S. Army Special Forces’ assessment 
and selection (SFAS) process—takes place over a period of 10 days. Each daily training 
session takes up to 20 hours.91 At the beginning of the process, candidates must pass a T4-
level physical and health test; only candidates who pass these tests can continue to the next 
stage of the actual selection process.92 At the same time, a 2nd SOF Group psychologist 
 
88 Prerequisite for application requires from the enlisted, soldiers, NCOs or officers in professional or 
contract career their commander’s affirmation, likewise the medical eligibility, and maximum 40 years of 
age. 
89 “Kiválasztó – második alkalommal,” August 2, 2020, https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/
kivalaszto-masodik-alkalommal.html. 
90 Both men and women can apply for selection, but so far only men have been able to complete 
successfully. 
91 The legal and official framework is based on the Hungarian Special Operations Doctrine, General 
Military Accident Prevention and Health Regulations Manual, and Military Land Navigation Manual. 
Addition the 2nd SOF Group has its own Training Program Manual f to provide the flexibility and 
professional document-based consistency.  
92 The T4 category is the highest physical level assessment requirement in the HDF. In addition to 
SOF, it is typically in use as official requirement for reconnaissance forces. 
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supports the instructor team by assessing each candidate’s intellectual abilities and 
motivation.93 The psychological testing consists of the following four main parts: a 
preliminary interview, which consists of a semi-structured 25-question confidential 
interview with each candidate;94 specific intelligence tests;95 observation of applicants’ 
conduct in group communication and physical activity; and an exploratory interview with 
candidates who withdrew from selection. The preliminary interview also helps to track the 
current adjudication of the 2nd SOF Group, the gained information from those candidates 
who volunteer from other branches, or rarely, from the MoI elements. These candidates’ 
opinions about the 2nd SOF Group could help the Group to develop and refine the effective 
advertising method specifically tailored to attract soldiers in other branches. In addition, 
the motivational interviews may reveal more than just evidence of exclusionary reasons. 
The results can help instructors adjust and change the workload with respect to a particular 
individual, to test his reactions and capabilities.  
The individual physical and psychological test activities last for three days. 
Candidates who pass move on to the second phase, the land navigation test—a test of an 
individual’s capacity to adapt and endure under challenging conditions—which measures 
the candidate’s stamina. The final phase is the teamwork phase, which is executed over the 
next three days.96 The selection ends with a 35 km full-equipment march after a planned 
period of sleep deprivation.  
 
93 The psychologist’s official statements provide an opportunity to screen and filter out personnel, 
who demonstrate deviant, destructive patterns. 
94 These predefined questions are asked in a flexible order, to allow the psychologist to react and 
guide the conversation if some sensitive issues are emerging, which can highlight the deviant or instable 
stamina. The purpose of this interview is to assess each candidate’s personality and personal skills, and to 
identify who is not suitable. In addition, this pre-constructed image forms the basis for the psychologists 
about the person, which helps to track the possible development or reflexion of the person’s character and 
motivation during the actual measurement points and tasks. 
95 Siklódi mentions the OTIS II. type human intelligence test, Miller - technical intelligence test, 
Raven’s non-verbal test procedure mobilizing a wide range of cognitive functions, and personality tests 
(CPI, IKE, EPQ). 
96 Kiképzési Program,Különleges Műveleti katonák, alegységek és törzsek részére, Training manual, 
Special Operations Forces, for units, and staff elements(Published for the 2nd SOF Group internal use 
2014), 6–7. 
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The key point here is that even if all candidates meet the physical level required by 
category T4 as an entry requirement, instructors view that test only as proof that the person 
is eligible to begin the more rigorous phase of selection. The candidates must also complete 
a high number of additional physical and psychological tasks over the entire ten-day 
duration of the selection to contribute to a more robust assessment of individual ability. 
The psychologist group asks candidates questions related to physical factors through 
surveys that involve imaginary situational and role-playing scenarios, which gives 
candidates a glimpse into the challenges of SOF missions, but candidates who move to the 
next stage still have to demonstrate their ability. The selection aims to exert and increase 
continual physical and psychological pressure on the candidates. These circumstances 
simulate realistic pressure under live operations so that the candidates’ real level of 
motivation, endurance and will to perform can be measured.  
With regard to team activities, all candidates are tested in both leadership and 
subordinate positions multiple times. Candidates are not allowed to wear the insignia of 
their ranks (they wear numbers instead), so all candidates are treated in the same way. All 
tasks, including leadership-related ones, are measured in scenarios that do not necessarily 
require a high degree of military expertise, to avoid disqualifying those with fewer years 
of service. To determine signs of willingness and unconventional thinking—based on 
fictional scenarios—the tasks do not require candidates to have a deep tactical background, 
but rather a quick, adaptive problem-solving attitude, a positive mindset, the ability to work 
as part of a team and a high level of endurance.  
In sum, the selection process aims to generate and continuously maintain an 
environment that completely pushes candidates out of their comfort zones, testing their 
physical and mental abilities through continuous physical and psychological pressure, both 
at individual and teamwork levels. Officially, a candidate who successfully passes the 
initial medical examinations, the physical entry criteria, then presented a continuous and 
convincing physical and mental caliber and passes the individual and team psychological 
34 
examinations97 during the 10 days has successfully completed the selection process, and 
is eligible to start the Hungarian Special Operations Basic Course (SOBC) later.98 Upon 
the selection completion, the 2nd SOF Group’s commander decides,99 based on a detailed 
back-brief and survey sheets documented up by the instructors and input from the 
psychologist, whether or not the candidate met the conditions that suggest success in the 
SOF, and who can therefore continue in the SOBC pipeline, or whether a candidate is 
approved only to try another selection in the future. Under the current regulations, a 
candidate who decides to voluntarily withdraw, or simply fails any task (not, necessarily, 
for medical reasons)100 can try the selection only twice.  
3. Case Study: HDF’s Efforts to Widen 2nd SOF Group’s Recruitment 
Pool—The SOF Camp 
The Special Operations Forces Camp (SOFC), organized in 2018, is a case of a 
joint successful recruitment endeavor by the HDF and SOF. Among many recruitment 
driven camps,101 the SOFC is the only event organized annually by the HDF specifically 
 
97 Eleven specific SOF required skills—Quality of task performance, creativity, leadership efficiency, 
teamwork, adaptive learning, communication skills, task orientation, soul presence and stress tolerance 
builds up the frame of the competency list—were monitored during all activities. Of these, communication 
skills, stress tolerance, creativity, leadership efficiency, and teamwork were examined with high priority. 
98 Ibid., 7–8. 
99 Due to continuous cooperation between the USA and the Hungarian Government, a large number of 
soldiers of the HDF have been able to take part in various training programs in the United States, partly in 
accordance with the requirements of the 2nd SOF Group’s selection. In those particular cases, the 2nd SOF 
Group’s commander has the authority to decide to accept the course in question to eliciting the selection. 
Nowadays the following foreign (U.S), and national courses come under consideration: Ranger School, 
Sapper School, Reconnaissance And Surveillance Leader’s Course. The only Hungarian course in 
particular is the Rohamlövész tanfolyam, as the Hungarian Special Combat Infantry School, pendant to the 
U.S. Army Ranger School. 
100 Measuring entry requirements is simply based primarily on physical and health considerations; if 
the candidate has the medical approval and can pass the T4 level physical test level, the candidate can start 
the selection. The current 2nd SOF Group regulations allow candidates to regenerate on medical leave for a 
maximum of 48 hours on the advice of the medical staff. 
101 Various services, and programs were developed by the apparatus of the MoD and HDF, such as; 
Military cadet Program, HDF Scholarship System, Military Elementary School Education, National 
Military-Sports Competition, Higher Education Scholarship Program and the different Military Camp(s). 
Since 2017 the annually organized SOFCs allowed 106 men and women to participated so far. “Különleges 
honvédelmi tábor felnőtteknek,” July 17, 2019, https://honvedelem.hu/media/aktualis-videok/kulonleges-
honvedelmi-tabor-felnotteknek.html. 
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for men and women 18 years or older in age.102 The event enables participants to gain 
extensive insight into military life, and more closely into the world of the 2nd SOF Group. 
In 2018, preliminary surveys103 showed a high level of interest in offering the camp, so 
two camps were conducted at the same time; one was designated as an advanced SOFC. 
The main requirement for the targeted group was to have had past experience within the 
Armed Forces, such as in the HDF or police, or even being a former participant of the 
previous SOFC which was organized in 2017. This recruiting concept had a dual purpose: 
to convince the ex-military, or police serviceman, who show increasing interest in re-
joining the HDF in recent years, while convincing hesitant participants to sign up for the 
SOFC again too.  
The camp covered all aspects of targeted recruitment, assessment, selection, and 
training. Eighty percent of the participants ultimately joined the HDF after the camp. To 
support the updating of the HDF’s employer brand, modern equipment was used, and one 
SOTG was dedicated to presenting and communicating this message in a method designed 
to reache a wide target audience, as well as investigate segment of society’s habits and 
suspected needs. The SOFCs were implemented in the mold of the 2nd SOF Group, 
involving one Special Operations Task Unit (SOTU) and a limited number of Special 
Operations Task Group personnel.  
This opportunity enabled the advanced SOTG to include an exercise designed 
around one of the SOF’s core tasks, exploiting capabilities in non-conventional operations. 
The advanced SOFC was conducted in a scenario that integrated all civilians and tasked 
them with conducting “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, 
disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”104 Thus the personnel of the 
 
102 In the official advertising campaign, and regarding to the given Hungarian appelation the event 
was named Special Forces Military Camp, but due to the involvement of the 2nd SOF Group, here in the 
folloving the term SOFC will be used.  
103 The Special Operations Inspectorate alog with the HDF HFKPÜ—the HDS’s office responsible to 
organize the NDEP military camps—measuered the initial responses via facebook and email responses 
from the previous year participants. 
104 Norbert Tajti, “Enhancing Hungarian Special Forces through Transformation--the Shift to Special 
Operations Forces,” n.d, 126, 18. 
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assigned SOTU gained the opportunity to practice and also to assess the capability of the 
participants in a realistic scenario. Additionally, the scenario provided an unexpected 
benefit; the SOFC enabled the instructors to gain insight into the level of the participant’s 
willingness and capacity to engage as a resistance element in case they were needed for a 
homeland security situation. Due to the potential deployment of resistance forces from a 
national defense perspective, the application possibilities of the reserve forces deserve 
further research.105 This event was not just a part of the recruitment campaign, but the 
HDF gained a more detailed view of the capability, dedication, and motivation of potential 
volunteers. 
Promoting the SOFC only on social media in a one-month period resulted in 
hundreds of people inquiring every year. In 2018, nearly a hundred applicants were directly 
contacted in the following steps, and due to the limited places, forty106 of them were 
selected. The order of registration and the screening of the Military National Security 
Service (MNSS)107 and medical suitability played a significant role in the pre-selection 
process. However, since 2018, places remain limited and inquiry is high; there has been a 
significant number who have applied and obtained the appropriate approvals, yet on the 
day of commencement or immediately thereafter, voluntarily withdrew from participation, 
likely due to waning motivation. In terms of the recruiting potential of this program, and 
in the light of resource management,108 the absence of the potential personnel amounts to 
a loss for the HDF in terms of time and money invested. 
There are two main reasons potential participants fail to follow through. First, the 
candidate does not receive ongoing contact such as through inspirational messages, e.g., 
through a closed Facebook group, that could consistently stimulate or even boost his/her 
 
105 A mandatory confidentiality statement was required from the participants. The results of the 
interim and final questionnaires also confirmed that, –although in a small number- but not everyone would 
give up his/her job or existence for the active service, but in a national defense situation like the scenario, 
resistance activity and its importance would make them join clearly. 
106 The strenght of 40 personnel represented both the SOFC basic, and the SOFC advanced in total. 
107 Military National Security Service (MNSS) represents the military branch of the National Security 
Services. 
108 During the SOFC a significant ammount of supply and resources from the blank ammunition to 
the fuel perspective for aerial assets has been used. 
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level of excitement and motivation to attend. Second, despite receiving consistent contact, 
the applicant does not proactively follow the updates over time, so when the day comes to 
report to camp, the candidate has changed his/her mind.109 The main tool for 
communication regarding these SOFCs was e-mail. However, while email ensures 
continuous communication between the individual and the dedicated organizer,110 the 
information flow via email in terms of sequencing and quality is limited.  
While email contact has its drawbacks, George F. McGrath provided an important 
argument for email marketing in his thesis Email Marketing for the U.S. Army and Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) Recruiting: “people prefer to use the internet because it is cost-
efficient, saves time, and it is more convenient.”111 The advanced SOFC proved that a 
modern, progressive approach to training in line with the expectations of the age group is 
effective to address and motivate today’s young people. It is also effective to increase the 
interest and will among civilians to join the reserve forces, and for reserve forces to expand 
their training programs, which could in turn aid retention. “In addition to acquiring tactical 
knowledge, basic military values such as discipline, teamwork, camaraderie, national self-
awareness can be developed during the program without their direct practice or 
education.”112  
During the advanced SOFC, three questionnaires were given to participants. The 
first one, constructed by the SOTG staff, was given at the beginning of camp, and included 
general questions measuring the participant’s initial opinion about the HDF. The second 
one—led by two students of the University of Eötvös Lóránd—was given after the first 
week, and surveyed the participant’s opinions with regard to the SOFC’s atmosphere. The 
third—a synthetical survey conductedby the SOTG—was given right after the closing 
 
109 There is no financial loss for the civilian candidates, as they will have to pay the already extremely 
low price for the camp on the day of enrollment only. 
110 In the case of the SOFC camps, the MH HFKPÜ and the Special Operations Inspectorate were 
partly designated in terms of contact build-up and pre-organization. 
111 George F McGrath, “Email Marketing for U.S. Army and Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Recruiting,” n.d, 94. 
112 Honvéd Vezérkar, Hadműveleti Csoportfőnökség, General Staff of the Armed Forces, Official 
report for internal use, HUN CoS 2017, 3. 
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ceremony, and sought to measure the participant’s willingness to join the HDF, linked to a 
presentation about the HDF’s contracting opportunities.  
The maximum number of participants for the advanced SOFC was was set at 20. 
The number of participants decreased to 13 before the camp started, mainly because they 
changed their minds. Of the 13 candidates who participated, 12 were male, 6 were between 
the ages of 18 and 24, and 3 were over 40. Interestingly, the 25–29 age group was not 
represented. The absence of participants in this last group could be explained by the 
inflexible nature of the workload and the schedule typical of a first-usually-civilian job 
assignment, which offers fewer holidays, while the 18–24 age group were more likely able 
to use their holidays during the school’s summer break.  
The recruitment goal of the exercise was fulfilled, as 10 of the 13 members 
considered joining the HDF. Two of them planned to join the 2nd SOF Group, while 6 were 
specifically interested in the SOTG, who organized and led the advanced SOFC. The 
statement of the participants supported by the surveys, and their following inquiries, proved 
that the close involvement of the 2nd SOF Group operators carries an effective recruiting 
potential. 
Beyond the nature of the event, the most determining factor was the credibility of 
the instructors. The experiences of the SOF trainers gave the real atmosphere of the camp. 
The procedures and methods described in the regulations and manuals may not be sufficient 
alone to implement a successful program. So, the didactic foundation has been proven here 
as well the reality, in addition to “what we teach” at least is important—if not more—is 
who should teach?113 
Based on the surveys and additional opinions, clear deficiencies were confirmed. 
Even if the personal satisfaction of the participants in the advanced SOFC were rated 
extremely positive, and their willingness to choose a military career was proven to be high, 
if the HDF is unable to act quickly, potential personnel could be lost due to intense labor 
market competition. Based on the unanimous opinion of the participants in 2018, the 
 
113 Honvéd Vezérkar, Hadműveleti Csoportfőnökség, General Staff of the Armed Forces, Closing 
Report, Official report for internalu se, HUN CoS 2017, 3. 
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quality of the media products did not meet the requirements of the 21st century’s brand, the 
textual content often evokes a bygone era, or contains inaccuracies or misapplication of 
military terminology. Ambrus Péter agrees in the Generációs kihvások kezelése a Magyar 
Honvédségben114 that the role of the media and Internet sites, in the promotion of the 
military service and the HDF, to gain social recognition is unquestionable. Significance of 
the proper employer brand and its advertisement has to be communicated with the 
necessary intensity and appropriate method. The importance of social media stands out; in 
2019, the majority of applicants and the earliest responsive individuals came from a 
community who had created a Facebook group(s) and Twitter profile for themselves based 
on the friendships and ties from the previous year.  
To sum up, the recruitment media tools and capabilities operated by the MoD and 
the HDF provide sufficient coverage of the activities of the 2nd SOF Group, and the brigade 
is regularly involved in active recruitment programs, i.e., public and capability 
demonstrations. As such, even though SOF generally avoids publicity, they still conduct a 
particular level of public engagement in order to promote the brigade to civilians, but also 
to the HDF’s other elements.  
C. ANALYSIS OF THE 2ND SOF GROUP’S MANNING: PROGRESS AND 
CHALLENGES 
The 2nd SOF Group’s manning endeavors have had varying achievements in terms 
of successful recruitment and retention of capable personnel. Indeed, the current HDF’s 
recruitment strategy has helped the military recruit the right and adequate Hungarians. As 
the 2nd SOF Group assimilates into the HDF’s current recruitment system, this strategy has 
also successfully contributed to maintaining the brigade’s professionalism and vice 
versa.115 The SOFC, in particular, confirms this recruitment synergy between the HDF 
and the 2nd SOF Group. A small number of SOF personnel are able to implement, plan and 
execute activities—with relatively low financial cost—under high flexibility to achieve the 
 
114 LtCol. Péter Ambrus, „Generációs Kihívások Kezelése a Magyar Honvédségben,” Managing 
Generational Challenges in the Hungarian Defence Forces (Honvédelmi Szemle 2020/4), 118. 
115 “Honvédségi Szemle 2009 | Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár.” 
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HDF’s and the 2nd SOF Group’s simultaneous goals for recruiting. Based on the 
background, time, and experience spent in other assignments, an external volunteer can 
bring unique and useful experience redundance into the brigade. Therefore, for example, a 
soldier who completes the SOBC, and possesses artillery or engineer background, can 
increase the capability and knowledge of a SOTU, because SOF—in general—relies also 
on conventional sustainment and support. Hence, external recruitment remains a priority 
task for the 2nd SOF Group.  
Likewise, in the context of the internal 2nd SOF Group’s recruitment process, the 
selection results in fewer but higher-quality candidates who pass the required tests and 
challenges to advance to the SOBC. Indeed, as illustrated by the most current selection 
process, which occurred between July 22 and July 30 in 2020, of the 34 applicants, 7 
completed the 10-day selection and all seven graduated candidates were recommended to 
begin the Special Operations Basic Course.116 The seven successful candidates represent 
a realistic proportion—in terms of the average. However, the preliminary surveys, which 
functioned as an assessment, highly supported the result. The assessment proved that an 
individual’s motivation, character, family, professional background, goals, and military 
attitude must be measured before and during the selection. One observation was that the 
instructors, who led the selection 24/7 and placed the candidates under extreme pressure, 
must work in a more close coordination with the team of psychologists to gain a complete 
evaluation of any applicant.117  
In general, the candidates who successfully completed the selection in the summer 
of 2020 were strongly motivated to join the 2nd SOF Group, as Siklódi concluded in the 
report. They showed an appropriate level of teamwork capability, and they were 
characterized by adaptive thinking and task orientation; however, fields of weaknesses 
 
116 Viktor Siklódi, „Különleges Műveleti Kiválasztó-Felmérő Foglalkozás” (Special Operations 
Assessment and Selection (2nd SOF Group internal distribution, 12.08.2020, reg. Number 1097/33).  
117 The survey used here to present the motivational drives, and characteristics which led to success or 
failure was conducted and distributed for official use within the 2nd SOF Group by First Lieutenant Viktor 
Siklódi as the psychologist officer of the brigade’s medical branch.Source: Viktor Siklódi, Különleges 
Műveleti Kiválasztó-Felmérő Foglalkozás (Special Operations Assessment and Selection (2nd SOF Group 
internal distribution, 12.08.2020, reg. Number 1097/33). 
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were also discovered which required improvement. In 2020, the candidates’ unanimous 
impression was that the 2nd SOF Group was the top available option within the HDF. The 
potential of receiving high-end training and access to a variety of foreign armaments and 
equipment likely played a role in their conclusion. Highlighting the human environment in 
the 2nd SOF Group due to the considerable high expertise of the operators in service was 
also a crucial motivation to explore. The claim for a positive atmosphere, owing to the 
work and performance orientation, was described in the overall attitude of the candidates. 
According to the candidates, the HDF can be considered a stable, reliable employer and 
workplace. They had a strong desire to prove that they were the most suitable candidates 
to the 2nd SOF Group and also to their family and friends—an important recruitment 
criterion. 
The existence of a stable military attitude by candidates is highly beneficial to the 
HDF, because it can indicate a long(er) interest in military service. Siklódi conducted the 
preliminary interview with all 34 candidates,118 and stated that the majority of them had a 
so-called military attitude.119 Siklódi urges more research on this topic, because it cannot 
be explained only with impressions about the military life at a young age or just with the 
need for excitement and adrenaline. Family traditions, and family members who are or 
were in military service and who have influenced the candidate directly or indirectly, are 
also important elements. Further research can ultimately provide the HDF and the 2nd SOF 
Group with a deeper understanding of the psychological connections associated with the 
so-called military attitude. This knowledge in turn could allow establishing a more efficient 
and flexible targeted recruitment tradecraft.  
Despite this significant manning progress, the 2nd SOF Group’s internal recruitment 
process has been plagued by several challenges. To begin, although as compared to the 
other combat elements of the HDF, the 2nd SOF Group offers a more attractive career to its 
 
118 Ibid. 
119 This is an unconscious urge to which the candidates could not give an objective explanation. There 
may be many reasons for a “military attitude,” but the attraction to a military lifestyle as something to live 
for is significantly strong and measurable during the assessment. 
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personnel—in terms of good salary and generous monthly bonuses120—this attractive 
package does not seem to substantially incentivize RTG soldiers to join the SOTGs in the 
volume that could reduce the effects of the natural fluctuation. The reason for this 
unfortunate trend is that RTG soldiers generally do not want to give up their habitual 
working conditions, community, and friends. The higher monthly salary available in the 
SOTGs does not always motivate RTG soldiers to leave their current position, which gives 
them the opportunity to take part in frequent overseas deployments. The six- to seven-
month rotations ensure a significantly high salary, and the young, usually less-experienced 
soldiers, find the option more attractive. The soldiers who have several years of experience 
within other military branches and show interest in the selection and then the SOF specialty 
are often hesitant to apply, because of how they might be treated by fellow soldiers and 
commanders if they fail to make the selection and must return to their unit.121 In this sense, 
the way the 2nd SOF Group recruits from other military organization requires authorization 
from the higher command and official coordination.122  
The brigade’s current organizational culture—rooted in the fusion of two distinct 
battalions—poses an additional challenge to the 2nd SOF Group’s recruitment process. 
Both of the former battalions gave up their own identities in part to meet new challenges—
in terms of capability development—associated with the newly-created organization. The 
transition was especially challenging for both organizations involved, due to the fact that 
they were settled in the same garrison, located in the same base and had always maintained 
a healthy rivalry. This phenomenon, which can be called unit patriotism, is noticeably 
 
120 The stative monthly „special operation complements” differs in percentage in the distribution of 
the base rate, and is bound to the level of the individual’s qualification. The highest rate can be given to 
personnel with SOBC qualification and active position within one of the SOTGs. The lowest can be given 
to personnel within combat support, or combat service support, even staff positions in the SOTGs.  
121 The RTG soldiers’ concerns are based often the myths about the difficult selection, also on the 
following year of demanding training at the SOBC, with the uncertain chances of graduation. The aftermath 
based on this organizational phenomenon diverts the RTG soldiers from applying. Based on the authors 
survey conducted with the RTU soldiers in the summer of 2019, trough anonymous questionnaire. 
122 If the soldier’s reluctance stems from lack of official information, and the soldier is not aware of 
the official process of signing up or the nature of the selection, the 2nd SOF Group must manage the flow of 
information. The 2nd SOF Group has developed efficient methods to address this option. While in the past 
(even before 2012) mostly the military organizations were notified of upcoming selections by fax and 
email, today, the media and 2nd SOF Group official visits are increasingly used to improve the success of 
external recruitment. 
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present within the brigade, and still divides the 2nd SOF Group. The main, and perhaps the 
only, carrier of this attitude is the individual—the soldier, who views the fusion as a career 
regression. If this dynamic also exists at the leadership level—whether officers or NCOs 
as leaders—it creates a toxic environment, which sometimes impedes the optimal 
individual development cycle, described as the optimal internal recruitment.  
Unit patriotism can be seen in a positive light, but like the word fluctuation—used 
in human resources management—it mostly describes a challenging, negatively charged 
occurence. On one hand, patriotism refers to loyalty, faithfulness, and to a strong bond that 
ties a person and his/her attitude to a community. On the other hand, unit patriotism can 
generate an internal resistance to any development that might affect habitual conditions, 
beliefs, even identity. Usually, this resistance manifests in a person in the form of a negative 
or pessimistic attitude, but resistance could escalate to a larger problem if it affects 
leadership and the decision making. Regarding the 2nd SOF Group, unit patriotism has 
existed since the two former battalions were merged into a brigade, and even if it is not a 
dangerous, inhibitory phenomenon, it affects internal manning processes, and, slightly, 
morale.  
Another challenge to the 2nd SOF Group’s manning stems from the brigade’s 
rigorous selection process—which limits the number of possible operators. Indeed, due to 
the strenuous recruitment standards, not all candidates are able to complete the selection 
process, and are therefore forced to drop out. Either the instructors remove him, or these 
candidates voluntarily withdraw (as they realize that they do not have the physical strength 
and/or the mental mindset to continue).123 The rejected or withdrawing candidates pose an 
additional challenge to the selection process. Sometimes, candidates who cannot meet the 
training standards attempt to hide their pain (in the case of injury, for example) or 
weaknesses (in the case of psychological tests) to avoid being perceived as weak by their 
team members.124 These candidates ultimately have a deleterious effect on team synergy 
 
123 When the candidate suffers an injury, it is the medical team that orders to remove the person from 
the selection for safety precautions. 
124 According to Siklódi. the 27 candidates who failed to continue the selection process in 2020 
manifested these characteristics. 
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and morale, as their behavior illustrates that they are not cut out for the SOF job, which 
requires physical and mental adroitness and a talent for teamwork. As such, the relatively 
high dropout rate reveals that the pre-selection—considered as the conclusion—process is 
far from perfect.125 Therefore, the selection and its requirements must be treated highly 
carefully. All in all, even if the attrition rate negatively affects the 2nd SOF Group’s ability 
to fill the SOF operator positions, the standards must be considered as assurance for the 
successful mission and the operator’s life.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Since Hungary is not only a NATO member but also the framework nation of the 
Regional Special Operations Command (R-SOCC),126 which has to achieve the FOC in 
2024, the stakes are high. Hungary’s national interests, as well as its commitments in the 
alliance, have given the 2nd SOF Group a significant opportunity to gain military 
experience in operational theatre and in the field of multinational cooperation. Still, the 
legacy and future of the special operations capability are largely preserved and carried 
forward by the 2nd SOF Group’s operators, so these personnel are key cornerstones for 
maintaining this extraordinary capability.  
The 2nd SOF Group has an enormous potential regarding its own targeted 
recruitment, but at the same time it suffers from significant limitations. In terms of 
potential, the brigade offers most of the potential any modern employer brand must offer; 
at once, it carries the presence of modern technical equipment and weaponry, non-
conventional operational procedures, and the promise of adventurous life within the 
service. According to Judit Stummer,127 the younger generation expects these benefits, 
 
125 Even those candidates who pass these tests, and become SOF operators, become extremely 
stressed during training. Siklódi indicates when the candidates had to fulfill leadership positions anxiety 
and inadequate behavior occurred often. 
126 Followed by the initial agreements, the Regional Special Operations Component Command will 
involve four allied partners; Austria, Croatia, Slovaika and Slovenia beside Hungary as the framework 
nation. The command will reach its full operational capability by 2024.  
NATO, “Four Allies and one partner will create a regional Special Forces command,” 13 Feb. 2019. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_163360.htm 
127 Judit Stummer, “A Magyar Honvédség személyi állománya utánpótlás biztosításának lehetőségei a 
köz- és felsőoktatásban tanulók körében,” n.d. p. 180. 
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which dovetails with the HDF’s employer portfolio. Fundamentally, the 2nd SOF Group—
and one of its SF predecessors, the 34th SF Battalion—has consistently represented the 
modern image of the HDF since 2005.  
At the same time, the brigade also struggles with challenges. On the one hand, from 
the external side, the virtual presence and advertising strategies do not meet the trends and 
level of the quality that attracts civilians from the general population and soldiers within 
the HDF. On the other hand, its internal recruitment is restrained in the manning cycle, due 
to the highlighted factor of unit patriotism.  
The current HDF recruitment strategy has helped it to recruit Hungarians who can 
capably fulfill their roles in the military service. As the 2nd SOF Group takes on a larger 
role in the HDF’s current recruitment system, it benefits reciprocally in maintaining the 
brigade’s manning and professionalism. The SOFC, in particular, confirms this recruitment 
synergy between the HDF and the 2nd SOF Group. A small number of SOF personnel are 
able to implement, plan and execute activities—with relatively low financial cost—under 
high flexibility to achieve the HDF’s and the 2nd SOF Group’s simultaneous goals for 
recruiting. Therefore, involving the 2nd SOF Group in the HDF’s planning processes, and 
allowing its freedom of maneuver by planning and resource management, can ensure that 
execution and effect will be mutually beneficial. 
In sum, a small-state SOF can achieve strategic-level goals. It must be equipped 
with state-of-the-art tools, but as one of the SOF truths states, “Humans are more important 
than hardware.”128 Therefore, for the 2nd SOF Group, finding the right talent is a key task, 
and the importance of the human factor cannot be underestimated. The SOAS is the very 
first, but most vital, decisive point to allow only the right soldiers to progress further on 
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IV. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL SOF: BACKGROUND AND 
RESULTS 
Staffing the SOF with adequate number and skilled operators generally involves a 
four-phase cycle as follows: Recruitment; Assessment; Selection; and Training.129 This 
process is known in the U.S. Army as RAST. However, the objectives of this research 
require a fifth module to be added to RAST, Retention. This thesis’s survey aimed to 
identify similarities and differences among the six participating countries within the five 
main categories of RAST-R. Therefore, the survey’s question categories are based on the 
U.S. Army’s SF pipeline—RAST—but include retention as a measure of effectiveness in 
terms of human resource management. 
This chapter provides an analysis of this cycle involving six countries around the 
world—NATO and non-NATO members—based on a survey conducted by the author.130 
The findings of these surveys serve as the basis for this thesis’s suggestions for improving 
the 2nd SOF Group recruitment process.  
A. BACKGROUND ON THE SURVEY: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The survey conducted between August and September 2020 aimed to gain 
knowledge of RAST-R practices and results from the experience of SOF forces serving in 
different geostrategic environments, but with a similar strategic purpose and skillset. 
Although the surveyed countries differ from Hungary—as, for instance, they may face 
different security challenges and threats—ultimately, SOF recruitment processes and 
challenges are likely comparable. In this connection, the author surveyed six international 
military students at the Naval Postgraduate School: three representatives of NATO 
countries (from the Estonian Special Operations Forces, the Hellenic Special Forces, and 
the 8th U.S. Psychological Operations Group) and three representatives of non-NATO 
countries (from the Naval Special Operations Command from the Philippines, the Joint 
 
129 LTC Manuel A. Diemer, USAWC Strategy Research Project: Manning Special Forces in the 21 
Century: Strategies for Recruiting, Assessing, and Selecting Soldiers for Special Forces Training, (U.S. 
Army War Collage 2001), iii. 
130 The survey questions are included in Appendix A 
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Special Operations Command from Colombia, and the Special Operation Forces from the 
Lebanese Army).131  
The first category, “General Questions” (questions 1–8), focused on general 
challenges related to manning and exit rate. The two-way closed-ended (yes/no) format 
questions measured whether the respondent’s faced any challenges associated with filling 
and retaining operator positions within their SOF, and if yes, what corrective actions their 
SOF organization has undertaken. This category also examined in a two-way closed-ended 
(yes/no) question whether said change in manning and retention requirements have 
negatively affected the morale of the existing operators, a factor which can lead to an 
increased exit-rate. Furthermore, this category sought to assess the age and 
professional/military experience of new volunteers, which could be useful when assessing 
the volunteer distribution, therefore considering their motivational trends or hierarchy. I 
assumed that every country follows the philosophy of allowing “only the best qualified”132 
soldiers to join their elite ranks. Therefore, if the number of quality SOF operators after the 
long RAST process—in this case without the retention perspective—is decreasing, I asked 
whether the country utilizes changes to adapt with revised actions. 
The second category, “On Recruitment” (questions 9–14), aimed to assess how 
responsible and involved the SOF is in recruitment. The survey sought to examine the 
incentives to join SOF in the respective country, and the specific recruitment methods used 
by SOF in each surveyed country to convince individuals to join the SOF.133  
 
131 Four officers were students in the National Security Affairs Department, and two were students in 
the Defense Analysis Department. 
132 LTC Manuel A. Diemer, USAWC Strategy Research Project: „Manning Special Forces in the 21 
Century: Strategies for Recruiting, Assessing, and Selecting Soldiers for Special Forces Training,” (U.S. 
Army War Collage 2001), 2 
133 The virtual media plays a crucial role in advertising, the message—as recruiting in this case—can 
be spread easily and in large scale, but has its limitations also. This category investigates the measure of the 
effectiveness of the active, or even ex-operators involved in the recruitment. Face to face interactions with 
SOF operators based on their “credibility, appearance,” and advice to go further: testimonials, I assume can 
support the SOF operator recruitment effectively. In addition to forming a link between the civil society 
and the closed community of SOF. This form of communication may be the most effective and credible 
“myth-destroying” channel. See: Steven M. Swierkowski and Robert M. Burrell,Tactics, Methods and 
Techniques to Improve Special Forces in-Service Enlisted Recruiting, Thesis (NPS 2002), 58; and Craig 
Michael, Dispelling Myths About Special Operations Forces, (War on the Rocks, March 2017)   
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The third category, “On Assessment and Selection” (questions 15–26), examined 
personnel assessment and selection procedures, which are the first and most crucial 
milestones in the process of making SOF operators. The objective of the first part, 
assessment, is to filter out incapable candidates based on the unit’s expectations. The 
questions related to assessment surveyed how the responding countries focus on the 
physical and mental capabilities of candidates. The second part, selection, is a critical and 
essential part of the process, and some countries integrate it into their SOF basic course. 
The Assessment and Selection category also examined whether the respondent countries 
use any kind of separated selection phase before the SOF basic course. Selection processes 
are used to determine the individual’s will and mental and physical stamina, often tested 
under extremely rigorous conditions to simulate the realistic environment in which SOF 
operates. “Selection is not about finding the best people, but finding the right people who, 
like chalkboards, possess the right core competencies to be trainable.”134 Therefore, the 
survey’s set of questions sought to identify the similarities that prompt applicants to quit 
the selection. This category also sought to identify if a country experiences a continuous 
declining trend in the number of volunteers, and whether, due to the ratio of successfully 
selected candidates vice those who attrite, the countries’ SOF change their standards or 
methods. There could be the possibility that potential candidates may be able to complete 
the rigorous training and acquire the knowledge and skills that are needed, which may 
require a different method and a different gradation of physical and mental pressure during 
the initial period. The preliminary information135 revealed that not all countries use a 
separated phase as a selection to filter suitable personnel prior to their SOF basic training. 
In this case—without the rigorous selection process—a larger number of candidates will 
start the SOF basic training, especially if there were no preliminary caveats, such as 
minimum age, and/or service years, even in specific elements of the country’s armed 
forces. I assumed that if the training SOF pipeline does not contain a separated selection at 
 
134 “Leveraging Ethics in Military Leadership | Deloitte Insights.” 
135 My preliminary assumption is based on multiple unofficial discussion with international SOF 
during overseas deployments, or Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, or exercises. This sensitive topic 
always formed a debate in terms of breaking the established norms and system (f.e: leaving the selection 
phase behind), and adapting the follow on SOF basic training to enhance manning options. 
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the beginning, then the country’s SOF basic training, either throughout or during certain 
key periods, included deliberately specific events that aimed to filter out the potentially 
suitable recruits from the incompetent—in other words, as an integrated selection phase. 
On the one hand, SOF basic training should be a significantly challenging period for 
candidates, merely due to the acquisition of complex theoretical and practical knowledge 
resulting from the nature of the SOF core activities.136 On the other hand, if a larger 
number of young, sometimes inexperienced, applicants start SOF basic training, and the 
systematically increasing degree of the workload ensures their development, the possibility 
exists that the number of operators able to complete the pipeline may eventually increase.  
Whether during the selection or during the long SOF basic training period, the 
candidates face a high number of various challenges. The candidates must possess a strong 
mental endurance and the physical stamina to pass every obstacle. One of the factors 
leading to candidate failure—noted by Siklódi Viktor137and cited in chapter 3—can be the 
weakness or uncertainty of the candidate’s self-confidence. Based on the author’s 
experience, this factor can significantly increase due to the candidate’s not knowing the 
minimum level of requirements during the selection procedure. The fact that candidates 
must leave their comfort zone and confront their own boundaries, especially their 
weaknesses, is difficult for many candidates to overcome mentally, so they quit. I sought 
to measure the difference regarding the success ratio—through the answers of the 
responding countries—based on whether the standards are known or unknown by the 
candidates.  
This third topic also sought to assess post-injury circumstances; specifically, 
whether—followed by a justified and medically approved expert opinion—it is possible 
for a candidate to take permission for a certain time; “medical hold.” My experience is that 
a large number of physical injuries occur during selection procedures. Injuries are not 
always possible to prevent due to the nature of the tasks during selection; however, safety 
 
136 SOF core tasks can be diverse from the countries national interest, however, the core activities 
listed by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) covers the wide spectrum in terms 
of the participating countries int he survey. https://www.socom.mil/about/core-activities  
137 Siklódi is the Psychologist officer of the Medical Branch of the 2nd SOF Group. 
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must be a primary goal of the instructors and all facilitators involved. Based on my personal 
experience, the candidate’s fear of being injured, and losing their chance of passing the 
selection, can have a significant appearance in their performance.138 This occurrence can 
manifest in the candidate’s conscious and intentional modulation of their efforts, even if a 
selection scenario is designed to measure the individual’s instinctive stamina and 
maximum capability. Therefore, an authentic measurement of performance is more 
difficult to measure from the instructor’s side.  
The fourth category, “On Training” (questions 27–32), examined SOF basic 
training in general, even if these essential training events are country-specific in nature.139 
I assumed that if a particular SOF unit in a country regularly faces declining selection rates, 
it could either change its own standards or initiate preventive actions to increase the 
candidate’s chances. Therefore, I sought to find whether the surveyed countries use 
preparative training, such as a pre-training phase to enhance the candidate’s skills, before 
starting the actual SOF basic training. I sought to identify the training phases that have the 
highest fall-out rate compared to the country’s profile. On one hand, during the SOF basic 
training, the voluntary withdrawals or dismissals by the instructors, and injuries, will occur 
in high percentage. But on the other hand, during the training phase, the instructors and the 
SOF unit’s leaders are working with candidates who more likely to have the natural ability 
to become SOF operators. Hence, I also examined what kind of policies and routines are 
in use regarding the “recycle,”140 or otherwise, whether options are available for the 
candidates to continue or re-start the SOF basic training later, if an injury, voluntary 
withdrawal (VW), or other occasions caused them to defer. I tried to find whether there is 
 
138 My observations are based on the experrience gained when I was a participiant during HUN 
SOAS, and the HUN SOBC and the Special Combat Infantry Course in Hungary. Also when I participated 
in the U.S. Special Forces Qulification Course, or later led some of the 2nd SOF Group’s selections in 
Hungary. 
139 The previously mentioned attributes such as: security threath, economical background, etc, likely 
shapes the structure of the SOF basic training, and the desired skill of the operators. 
140John Black, Optimizing Special Forces Selection? Don’t bother, we don’t want it (SOFREP, Jan 
28, 2020) 
https://sofrep.com/news/optimizing-special-forces-selection-dont-bother-we-dont-want-it/  The term 
recycle can be considered as officially used especially in the U.S. ARSOF. Besides, many countries, such 
as Hungary adopted the term and is in use officially. 
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a potential trend between the different SOF military occupational specialties (MOS),141 in 
terms of popularity that attracts the candidates to become a SOF operator. My experience 
is that trends regarding the popular MOSs change periodically but are not trend-like 
evincible. For example, the RTG infantry soldiers often preferred the weapons specialist 
or engineer specialist MOS more than the communication specialist. The candidate’s 
expectation could be influenced by a common tie, such as friendship, and camaraderie 
among applicants, as well as a simple fear from a MOS that may be considered more 
difficult.142 In most cases, obviously, the choice above the MOS is not the candidate’s 
individual decision. The given demand—in terms of the gaps that have to be filled with 
new operators—will affect the military organization’s needs to determine the type and 
number of the needed MOSs, which will affect the distribution of candidates during the 
SOF basic training. The trainees will be designated for their future SOF MOS, thus their 
specialty and position in the SOTU will be initially decided. This decision can potentially 
affect an individual’s personal goals and thus their further motivation throughout their 
initial career in SOF.  
The fifth category, “On Retention” (questions 33–34), briefly assessed the possible 
reason for fluctuation and “exit ratio,” regarding personnel retention endeavors. This 
category sought the results in case of reduced norms and requirements within SOF 
organizations. Either from coercion due to manning problems or from an incorrect 
leadership decision, how negatively affected was the operator’s morale in the organization? 
Do the responding countries—at the operator level—experience a growing exit rate due to 
perceived or real decline in organizational values, such as entry requirements? Also, from 
the broad aspect, what are the main drivers behind the decisions of the operators who are 
leaving their SOF? 
The five categories of the questionnaire included 34 questions. Of these, 20 were 
constructed in a two-way closed-ended (yes/no) form and 5 questions were created in such 
 
141 In terms of the U.S. terminology, the 18 MOS series are in use in SOF. The HDF has its own 
official terms and codes for the assignment/specialty abbreviations, but they indicate the same occoptaional 
specialties, for example the weapon specialist or the intelligence NCO. 
142 This assumption is based often by steretypical information,, f.e: the simplicity of the weapons 
specialist, and the accentuated dificulty of the medical specialist requirements.  
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a way as to be answered by placing the given criteria in numeric order. The remaining 9 
questions were created in such a way as to allow the participants to express their views in 
a short text form, but to avoid asking a personal-subjective opinion or an opinion that is 
predictive in nature point of view.143  
B. SURVEY RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS 
The following assessment presents the results provided by the six responding SOF 
representatives. To protect the identity of the participants, the assessment and Appendix B 
will use the two categories NATO SOF and NON-NATO SOF to present the results—the 
three NATO SOF countries first, and the three NON-NATO SOF countries second.144 The 
structure follows the organization of the questionnaire, summarizing the qualitative 
outcomes and the quantitive information. In many cases, the assessment also includes the 
respondents’ textual answers; therefore, some keywords revealing their identities have 
been obscured. The main limitation—due to the length of the questionnaire—is the form 
of the analysis. Instead of a complete report, presenting all the questions and all 
respondents’ individual answers, the results are summarized.  
See Appendix A, “Questionnaire,” for the questionnaire used to gather participant 
responses, and Appendix B, “Summary of the Responses,” for a summary of participants’ 
responses.  
1. Assessment of the Responses to the General Questions  
Four of the six participants claimed that within the past 5 to 10 years their SOF unit 
experienced challenges regarding manning minimum requirements. The two exceptions 
were represented by the NON-NATO SOF E and the NATO SOF C. To the next question, 
which examined manning problems in terms of experiencing challenges to fill the positions 
of SOF operators, in parallel with the growing proportion of exit rate from the SOF unit, 
 
143 I took these limitations fully into consideration while establishing the questionnaire, so the 
respondents represent only, and exclusively the unified and official point of view of their Special 
Operations Forces element in question.  
144 However, I believe in some points it is highly beneficial to observe the causes and effects in a 
given country’s answer in the flow of RAST-R. In order to present these correlations while preserving 
security measurements, all respondents are named randomly with alphabetical letters as well. 
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the results are almost homogenous. Five countries agreed regarding the challenges to filling 
the empty positions of SOF operators, while the NON-NATO SOF E has not faced such a 
challenge. 
Regarding the reduction of the basic volunteer requirements for entry, only the 
representative of NATO SOF A answered in the affirmative, explaining with: 
...the selection process was re-evaluated and basically restructured. The main 
reason was not to lower the bar or requirements but to select the people who might or 
potentially have the SOF required capabilities. The real test actually continues after the 
selection when the new [candidates] go through Special Operator Basic Course [for the 
length of] (6-8 months).145  
Specifically, only the NON-NATO SOF E took steps to lower the standards and 
requirements from the physical and psychological perspective. The representatives from 
the other five countries stated that their standards were not modified. However, the NATO 
SOF A respondent noted that “Although it seems, that the standards (physical) were 
lowered in [the] selection, the candidates still have to successfully finish the 6–8 months 
SOBC course where standards are unchanged.”146 The NATO SOF C representative 
emphasized his disagreement on the effectiveness of lowered standards to overcome 
manning issues by noting. “Actually, the quality of personnel increased with more tailored 
selection and training.”147 In the case of reduced physical and psychological requirements, 
and its documented negative effect on the morale within the SOF organization, five 
countries gave negative answers, while the NON-NATO SOF E answered in the 
affirmative. Finally, only the NON-NATO SOF F experienced an increased exit-rate 
between the trained SOF operators; four participants did not. One country—NATO SOF 
C—did not respond to this question.  
The survey confirmed that manning problems pose significant challenges to SOF 
globally. Two-thirds of the respondents indicated the decreasing number of new volunteers, 
 
145 Appendix B, q. 3. 
146 Appendix B, q. 4.  
147 Appendix B, q. 4.  
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while all respondents agreed that the exit rate from the trained operators is higher than that 
of the newly integrated operators. Nonetheless, the vast majority retained their standard 
physical and psychological requirements to join their SOF unit, and maintained their 
selection standards. The trend that, on average, the generation between the age of 23–27 
signs up, with 3–5 years of military experience seeking excitement and challenge, was 
detected too. 
2. Assessment of the Answers to the Questions on Recruitment  
Four out of six respondents stated that their country has a specifically SOF-oriented 
recruitment system. Exceptions were represented here by the NON-NATO SOF E and the 
NATO SOF C. The NON-NATO SOF D stressed the importance of the contact, and then 
recommendations through active SOF operators within the organization: 
…We recruit only from the services … based on personal contact between active 
operators and other branch members in active duty. After getting a list of recommended 
personnel, we request them to the specific service command, and after approval, they are 
disposed to participate in our selection course. For the latter, soldiers are recruited only 
from the Army. We have a SOF recruitment committee that travels to different Army 
Divisions. Assessing different soldiers’ profiles. After a comprehensive evaluation, those 
selected are allowed to start the SOF selection course.148 
The NATO SOF C made the following comment: “A recruitment … has a specified 
program to promote new recruits to join. The recruitment … puts up advertisements in 
regular units, holds recruitment events, conducts face-to-face counseling, and offers 
monetary incentives to join [the] SOF units.”149 
With regard to the question of whether the SOF of a given country are deliberately 
involved in the planning and implementation part of the recruitment strategy,150 the NATO 
SOF B and the NON-NATO SOF E answered with negative, while the other four countries 
 
148 Appendix B,  q. 9.  
149 Appendix B, q. 9. 
150 Appendix A, q. 10 
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are deliberately involved. In contrast, NON-NATO D emphasized that “The SOF 
organization provides a recruitment committee to assess and select candidates in different 
Army units.”151 
Regarding recruitment methods—based on the feedback from the respondents—
personal contact between the active operators and other individuals in active service proved 
to be the most effective method. In addition, the NON-NATO SOF D listed the official 
recruitment within the military as the most effective, which here can be interpreted from 
the SOF side toward conventional forces as part of an established and routine recruitment 
strategy. Interestingly, the NATO SOF C noted primarily the effectiveness of social media, 
then the official website, and third, personal contact. In terms of the least effective method, 
printed media presented a consensus.  
In terms of social media presence, only two nations are represented on Facebook, 
the NATO SOF A and the NATO SOF C. The other four countries are not present on social 
media. In this context, the NATO SOF A respondent highlighted its effectiveness: 
“Facebook page has turned out to be very successful. Also, our people (anonymously) will 
write articles [for] domestic military magazines (very often these articles are cited or 
referenced to our main news pages or domains).”152 Only the representatives from the 
NATO SOF A and NATO SOF C answered yes to the question of whether they have the 
right to manage and administer their “own” social media portfolio. 
The answers seeking to locate the main motivational factors for joining the SOF 
revealed that the factors of excitement and challenge came in first. The least contributing 
factor that drives individuals to volunteer to join their SOF was brotherhood, not far ahead 
of “money..” 
The methods of effective recruitment are divided into two main fields: using social 
media as an necessary shaping effort, and as more importantly, using active SOF members 
as a face to face promotional method. It can be concluded from the answers that the social 
media and face-to-face contacts reinforce each other; they do not necessarily exploit the 
 
151 Appendix B, q. 10. 
152 Appendix B, q. 12.  
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desired recruitment result separately. To achieve favorable results in recruitment, the 
majority of the countries have a SOF-focused recruitment campaign at the DOD/MoD 
level, and the SOF—at the unit level—is physically involved in the implementation.  
3. Analysis of the Answers to the Questions on Assessment and Selection
 With regard to the questions related to pre-selection, all respondents 
indicated that they have a type of pre-emptive screening, and in all cases, both physical 
and mental abilities are measured. NATO SOF C also highlighted the factor of 
aptitude measurement.153 The NATO SOF A respondent mentioned that language skills 
and prior study qualifications are also additional measurement aspects. All countries 
utilize a separate phase as selection, except the NON-NATO SOF F.  
Regarding the physical requirements, based on the respondents’ answers, similar 
types of physical tests are routine,154 adjusted to the standards of their armed forces. For 
example, in the NON-NATO SOF D, 100% is considered the accepted standard level, 
while in the case of the NATO SOF C, an additional 10% above the regular physical norms 
is expected from the candidates.  
In the case of the question of whether the SOF unit found these standards adequate 
to test the candidate’s initial capacity, while also being realistically achievable for the 
candidates, the NON-NATO SOF D and the NATO SOF C respondents strongly agreed, 
while the other four countries agreed.  
In the case of the classified and released selection standards, the distribution is 
varying; NATO SOF B, and NATO SOF A and the NATO SOF C are not sharing the 
information with the candidates. The other three countries are doing so. During the NATO 
SOF A’s selection, only the first physical test requirements are disclosed to the candidates. 
The NATO SOF B is applying both methods, while in the case of the NATO SOF C, the 
official physical requirements are disclosed, at the same time the standards of 
153 NATO SOF C’s operational profile consist multiple non-kinetic capabilities, therefore aptitude 
tests could measure the candidate’s skills for example in negotiation techniques. 
154 In terms of aerob and anaerob physical exercises, such as: running, swimming, ruck marching and 
pull ups, push ups, and different upper and lower body strength exercises. 
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psychological skills, and the expectations during group tests, are not disclosed to the 
candidates.  
In the case of failing candidates, physical injuries proved to be the most common 
cause. The cause of failing during the selection was followed by two categories with only 
a slight difference: physical capabilities and lack of motivation and interest. The 
respondents had an almost unanimous opinion that the least common reason for failing or 
quitting during the selection is social integration/fit-in problems.  
A possible explanation for the high ratio of failing candidates due to injuries or 
weak physical strength and motivational endurance may be the answer of the respondents 
on when, or during which phase of the selection, causes the highest rate of failing 
candidates. The answers reveal that all countries have a significantly difficult period in 
their selection, often in the early days, to filter out the majority of the incapable candidates. 
The NON-NATO SOF E explained that the dropout rate occurs in the highest numbers at 
the beginning of the selection because participants are facing the challenges of a high level 
of pressure and expectations. Mental intolerance as a cause is here significantly high, while 
later during the selection the causes are more related to physical injuries.155 The high 
dropout rate is also reflected in the NATO SOF A respondent’s opinion that in the first 
phase, “the people with [the] wrong mindset, and illusions will drop out.” 156 The NON-
NATO SOF D respondent’s assessment confirmed that the first period (s) of selection 
placed a greater and more intense burden on participants to consciously segregate weaker 
and/or less determined candidates.  
During the selection process, two out of six countries allow the use of fixed-
duration medical break (medical hold), represented by the NON-NATO SOF F and the 
NATO SOF C here. Within the answers, the NON-NATO SOF F stated that the medical 
hold’s duration is tailored to the different phases.157  
155 Appendix B, q. 24. 
156 Appendix B, q. 24. 
157 Appendix B, q. 25. 
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With regard to the question on changes in policies or strategies in the past 5–10 
years to achieve a higher success ratio during the selection, the NON-NATO SOF E 
mentioned that there have been efforts over the last six years to optimize physical pressure 
to a certain level to reduce the risk of injuries. The NON-NATO SOF D respondent 
mentioned their assessment-focused strategy of delegating a team of 3–4 officers, and non-
commissioned officers, to the Corporal’s Academy to conduct preliminary surveys. 
After a long and comprehensive assessment, candidates that demonstrate to have a 
SOF profile and voluntarily, are allowed to enter the selection process. However, due to 
their lack of tactical and technical expertise, these personnel if approve the selection 
process, will work in SOF support areas such as the Training Battalion or so, while continue 
to train and develop the required skills to be a SOF operator.158 
Without exception, all SOF respondents utilize an assessment process to screen and 
filter out candidates who are physically or mentally unsuitable. This preliminary 
assessment aligns with the 2nd SOF Group; furthermore, the selection’s physical 
requirements presented strong similarities. However, from the results, two approaches can 
be linked for improvement regarding the devised selection: first, as NON-NATO SOF D 
indicated, systematically organized pre-assessments—conducted on scene at the location 
of other military organizations; second—as highlighted by NON-NATO SOF F—that 
leadership play a crucial role to manage the changes in the organizational culture. The 
“traditional”159 mindset here does not mean keeping the values and standards, but not 
realizing the urge of adaptation to change habits or strategy.  
4. Assessment of the Answers to the Questions on Training  
Two of the six respondents—NATO SOF A and NON-NATO SOF E—indicated 
that they use a kind of preparation training that seeks to increase the chance for the 
candidates to complete their selection. The NATO SOF A respondent also linked their 
unique approach, that could be seen as an innovative recruitment tool: “Starting from this 
 
158 Appendix B, q. 26.  
159 Appendix B, q. 26.  
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year, the SOF has its own dedicated and selected conscripts and also continues to train 
dedicated SOF supporting units in [a] voluntary national militarized organization--Defense 
League (somewhat similar to National Guard).”160 
There was no uniform answer to the question of which phase of SOF basic training 
causes the most dropouts. However, the answers indicate two significant phases or more 
activity types, such as the Close Quarter Battle (CQB), due to firearms discipline reasons, 
and the Small Unit Tactics (SUT), due to the intense physical pressure, and leadership 
skills. The NATO SOF C respondent highlights also a phase comprising “a series of 
aptitude tests/training when students fail and get recycled but they rarely quit.”161 In light 
of the regulations and established procedures for recycling, the similarity is quite high. In 
each respondent’s organization, the procedure allows the candidate to retry training from 
the module/block/phase where he or she gave up.  
The NON-NATO SOF D and the NATO SOF A stated that this option can be 
denied from the candidate if the reason was voluntary-withdrawal or the lack of 
motivational purpose, even disciplinary misdemeanor.  
In the case of the possible most popular MOS, the weapons specialist was marked 
on three occasions. NATO SOF C did not answer this question, but three respondents 
(NON-NATO SOF E, NATO SOF B, and NATO SOF A) mentioned the weapons 
specialist as more popular than other MOSs. 
Finally, no significant changes—in terms of training structure and policies—were 
made based on the feedback of the respondents, with the exception of changes in safety 
protocols.162 
SOF basic training is structured according to each country’s desired end state in 
terms of main capability and mission profile. With one exception—NATO SOF A—none 
of the respondents changed their training system. The represented SOF re-evaluated and 
 
160 Appendix B, q. 27. 
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restructured the selection criteria, to allow the chance for more candidates with 
advantageous educational background—for example, an IT technician—to pass. As a 
consequence of restructured selection, the SOF basic course was adapted to measure the 
candidate’s capacity during a longer period. In sum, all countries consider the candidates 
who have gone through the selection successfully as having an important value. All 
countries have their own policies to give—at least—a second chance to candidates to prove 
their willingness if they failed during the SOF basic course.  
5. Assessment of the Answers to the Questions on Retention  
All respondents noted that the most common causes regarding the exit rate of the 
trained and experienced SOF operators were primarily family-driven. Except for the 
NATO SOF C, this aspect was rated by everyone within the top three ranks. Unfortunately, 
further and accurate determination of the order became difficult, as not all respondents 
marked all the criteria in this question. Nevertheless, and based on the existing answers, it 
can be assumed that the next two reasons—with a slight difference—are the high pace of 
operational tempo and deployment cycle followed by the local civilian sector’s seductive 
and higher salary.  
The least possible explanation could be—although here one person did not 
respond—the declining vocation/dedication towards the military organization due to the 
lowered bar or altered requirements. 
To the last question, according to any implemented MoD/DOD policies or initiated 
actions to improve specifically SOF retention, I received affirmative in three cases and 
negative in the three remaining answers. NATO SOF A has not specifically explained the 
main features of the strategy, but the NON-NATO SOF D explained with the following: 
“the MoD in coordination with the services´ commanders dedicate a special budget and 
offer better opportunities for further education and specialized training both abroad and 
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locally.”163 Also, the NATO SOF C respondent mentioned the “monetary incentive offers 
(bonuses) and faster career progression offers”164 as the part of this approach. 
Examining retention is a complex task, because, in some cases, the draining effect 
of the labor market, the active presence of PSC organizations, and even the salary can 
generate specific subjective points of view in the given country. However, the majority of 
respondents indicated the lack of time with the families—from the SOF operator’s point of 
view. Either the operational tempo or training activities are the causes, both hard to reduce. 
The need for increased and quality time with families has a significant impact on the exit 
ratio between the SOF operators. To mitigate the exit rate, two of the three respondents 
highlighted MoD/DOD-initiated steps to prevent or compensate the loss of trained 
personnel, the financial benefits, career and special training and educational allowances. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The survey confirmed that manning problems pose significant challenges to SOF 
globally. Two-thirds of the respondents indicated the decreasing number of new volunteers, 
while all respondents agreed that the exit rate from trained operators is higher than the entry 
rate for the newly integrated operators. Nonetheless, the vast majority retained their 
standard physical and psychological requirements to join their SOF unit and also retained 
their selection standards. The trend was that the majority of the volunteers are between the 
age of 23–27 when signing up, with 3–5 years of military experience. The volunteering 
individuals are mostly driven by visions of excitement and challenge. The adventurous life 
in the closed world of the elite warriors proved to be more alluring than other possible 
motivation factors, especially the salary. The interested personnel’s attendance can be 
influenced through virtual advertisement, but their decision to join is highly dependent on 
the credible SOF member’s personal impression. The rising consequences of manning 
challenges, based on the decreasing number of volunteers and/or the growing number of 
exit ratio, indicated the magnitude of the targeted recruiting. Hence “to help ensure 
sufficient numbers of SF soldiers is to target and recruit the kinds of soldiers who are most 
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likely to succeed.”165 The larger pool of volunteers can bring positive results, but only if 






















165 LTC Manuel A. Diemer, USAWC Strategy Research Project: „Manning Special Forces in the 21 
Century: Strategies for Recruiting, Assessing, and Selecting Soldiers for Special Forces Training,” (U.S. 
Army War Collage 2001), 2 
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V. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS
The thesis aspired to illustrate the manning challenges that the 2nd SOF Group 
faces and to identify optimal corrective solutions. To that end, this thesis first investigated 
the 2nd SOF Group’s manning possibilities and procedures, and second conducted a survey 
of various countries to identify how SOF globally mitigates manning shortfalls, even how 
counterparts are approaching the problem in an innovative way. The results provided a 
basis to compare the current Hungarian methods and broader methods in terms of RAST-
R (Recruitment, Assessment, Selection, Training, and Retention).  
This chapter provides a comparative analysis between the Hungarian 2nd SOF 
Group’s and international SOF’s RAST-R processes. Finally, the findings obtained in 
possible improvements will be proposed—in the form of recommendations—for the 2nd 
SOF Group’s leadership, officers, NCOs, and enlisted men and women, my fellow 
comrades and friends. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Recruitment. The research has confirmed that successful recruitment currently
relies on two main methods: addressing the masses through virtual space, and, as the survey 
has shown, involving capable personnel from SOF forces. As a result of the survey, it can 
be stated that the use or non-use of social media cannot be explained only in terms of the 
level of operational security considerations, but more in terms of how effectively the 
possible pool of recruits could be reached and influenced. In the case of Hungary, for 
example—although the unambiguous success of social media was only partially confirmed 
by the survey—the HDF has undergone significant development since 2019, and this 
advertising approach can be considered a success in Hungary. The quality and frequency 
of use of media products reflect a high level of professionalism, either on social media or 
on various news portals. Ironically—albeit in a positive sense—one of my 
recommendations has become partly irrelevant. The 2nd SOF Group appeared on social 
media—on Facebook—on 11 November 2020, and the number of followers is growing 
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extremely fast, which could significantly increase the Group’s recruitment capacity.166 
From the international respondents’ survey answers, the most successful method involving 
SOF operators both in virtual advertisement and in face-to-face recruitment. The first-hand 
credible information, even in the form of an article on social media or during a public 
capability demonstration, proved the need for both methods simultaneously.  
Nevertheless, the recruitment aspect of the RAST-R sheds light on reality; 
professional, but mass-targeted, virtual messages can only be interpreted as a supporting 
effort. It is possible to keep a military organization in the public consciousness, reflect 
professionalism and create a promising image as an employer, but virtual media does not 
necessarily generate increasing numbers of volunteers. The comprehensive research has 
shown that it is the personal persuasion of active SOF operators or individuals delegated 
by the SOF that makes the recruitment system more effective. The purposeful involvement 
of SOF members, however they can be included, can be considered an essential part of 
targeted recruitment. The respondents’ statements in multiple places showed that their SOF 
are deliberately performing recruiting activities in military institutions where they are more 
likely to find the right people.  
This thesis also found that individual motivations may vary, and the cause of the 
personal motivation that drives a person to choose the dangerous but exciting lifestyle of 
SOF may never be detected. Although understanding motivation proved to be a crucial 
element during the research, the question remains: what motivates a person to decline the 
opportunities of the average life and its multitude of prosperities in favor of an 
extraordinary way of living? The comparative survey revealed—including the 2nd SOF 
Group—that motivation trends are highly similar globally: seeking excitement, challenge 
and adventure proved to be prioritized above money, traditions, and even brotherhood.  
This research also found that a recruitment strategy based on financial 
considerations is insufficient and unsubstantiated as effective. Since 2015, for example, the 
HDF has increased military salaries by more than 50% as part of a significant force 
166 “MH 2. Vitéz Bertalan Árpád Különleges Rendeltetésű Dandár | Facebook,” accessed November 
16, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/mh2krdd/. 
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development program.167 However, the empirical research and the survey have reinforced 
that salary is not the decisive motivational factor for joining SOF. Any strategy of an 
efficient and comprehensive RAST-R campaign based only on ensuring high wages is 
misconceived. This cannot be a sufficient condition, as this trend can be found across the 
whole spectrum of the Hungarian job market, and it is highly likely all employers are 
adapting themselves rapidly to the rising salaries. The reality is more complex in its nature 
because the current demand for labor in Hungary is much higher than the actual and 
predicted supply. The civilian labor market—which must be considered as a competitor—
constantly competes to acquire and retain valuable and indispensable manpower. In 
addition, the HDF’s diversified and at the same time specifically hierarchical system needs 
to meet a wider spectrum of labor potential than most civilian employers, which could be 
a more attractive incentive for the younger generation due to the modern employer and 
employee relationship. The applied Hungarian and international literature shaped the view 
that the current, and future, workforce must be interpreted in a different context by their 
needs. Generations “Y” and “Z” see the role of a leader or a college with differently. Their 
hierarchy of need has been extended with the tier of the informational environment, and at 
the same time, they are seeking a faster pace toward self-actualization. However, the 
reinterpreted Maslow pyramid cannot be considered unique in Hungary. The international 
SOF community is struggling with problems of similar origin, as was confirmed by the 
survey included in the research. 
Assessment. Significant efficiency weights of the targeted recruitment also builds a 
link to the next step in the RAST-R—the preliminary assessment of applicants prior to 
selection. This assessment is equally important to allowing qualified and trained personnel 
to fulfill recruiting tasks including advertising strategies The survey confirmed that all 
countries surveyed conduct a pre-screening, where a complex physical and psychological 
167The Zrínyi 2026 (Z2026) Defense and Force Development Program is the most comprehensive 
action initiated in the last thirty years regarding to defense development. In the framework of which the 
government set the goal of developing the domestic defense industry as widely as possible, in connection 
with the comprehensive technical and organizational development of the HDF. 
Zrínyi A, “A Zrínyi 2026 program. Korlátozott lehetõségek a magyar védelmi ipar fejlesztésére,” 
2026, 18. 
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assessment aims to filter out unsuitable candidates. The method of assessment is also 
efficiently used by the 2nd SOF Group, but only just before the start of the selection. Some 
of the responding countries conduct additional preliminary surveys “locally” at another 
unit’s garrison, which is considered a potential pool of candidates. The locally conducted 
preliminary assessment’s effectiveness is not only based on the needed screening, but it 
could also provide first-hand feedback on the motivation of volunteering soldiers to join or 
refuse to join.  
Selection. Selection plays a key role in shaping the organizational culture of any 
SOF. The research demonstrated that only the candidates with the right mental and physical 
abilities will have the opportunity to prove themselves in the next phase, selection. Like 
the 2nd SOF Group, each surveyed country uses a separate selection phase—or, where 
appropriate, a period integrated into the SOF basic training—during which the suitable 
soldiers are separated from the incapable ones. Selection is not just about finding the right 
person, it is about “also molding them into the common culture.”168 The purpose of 
selection is not to find the best people, but the right people, “who, like chalkboards, possess 
the right core competencies to be trainable.”169 The common characteristic in terms of all 
surveyed countries is the extreme physical and mental strain and pressure exerted on the 
candidates during the selection process. Within the NATO SOF community, an often 
voiced opinion, “the standards for joining are lowered,”170 had the potential to be proven 
internationally. However, the research refuted this expression considering all the surveyed 
countries reported that their standards had not been lowered, considering the requirements 
of joining and passing the rigorous selection in the surveyed countries and in Hungary. 
This is also a fact regarding the 2nd SOF Group, even though the number of operators 
passing all obstacles at the end of training shows a declining trend.  
 
168 “Leveraging Ethics in Military Leadership | Deloitte Insights.” 
169 Ibid. 
170 “U.S. Army Green Berets Accused From Within Of Lowering Standards, NPR.org, accessed 
November 16, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2017/12/15/570810197/u-s-army-green-berets-accused-from-
within-of-lowering-standards. 
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Training. The thesis researched the aspect of the SOF basic course only 
superficially. Although SOF core activities cover, in most cases, similar tasks, the 
geostrategic and environmental challenges of a given country may dictate a different end 
state in terms of the skills of the newly trained operators. At the same time, from the point 
of view of the manning potential, it can be stated that from the phase of SOF basic training, 
all countries, as well as the 2nd SOF Group, start to prioritize with retention in mind. This 
leadership attitude is manifested in the policy that soldiers who withdraw from training will 
be given the opportunity to resume the training modules later. By this time, the 
participating countries—and the 2nd SOF Group as well—have already invested significant 
time and money in a soldier who has the potential to complete the training. This long 
investment pays off in the person’s self-actualization phase. If the trained SOF operator is 
able later to professionally fulfill his/her position and return through their service the 
money, time, and trust invested by the system, then the military organization benefits as 
well.  
Retention. The research confirmed that the demand for SOF—and therefore SOF 
operators—grows, while the number of the potential future recruits declines. The challenge 
regarding manning strategies highlighted a second concern: experienced SOF operators are 
exiting SOF at a faster rate than they are being inducted. The last element of the 
abbreviation RAST-R—Retention—is a long process.171 This research revealed that the 
exit rate is high in all countries, in many cases outpacing the induction of newly trained 
operators. The exit rate poses a significant challenge to any SOF, especially when the main 
reason is the lack of time spent with the family. In this case, mitigation is difficult if the 
operational tempo is high, and the manning processes are not able to maintain a healthy 
fluctuation due to the decreasing number of new volunteers. 
To sum up, the research confirmed that the essential elements of RAST-R indicate 
a coherent system and that the order is not interchangeable. This acronym encompasses the 
time-consuming and costly process in which a civilian becomes a trained and professional 
171 Retention covers an interval where the operator is able to perform his duties professionally and, 
his motivation remains at a level that does not feel to compelled to leave the organization. 
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SOF operator over a period of years and then performs effective work within the military 
organization.  
In this context, based on Hungary’s national defense strategy and its commitments 
within the alliances, it largely refers to the fact that the 2nd SOF Group must have the right 
number and quality of special operators. In the 21st century, the role of special operations 
forces has increased, and their capabilities and responsibilities have expanded. To meet 
complex tasks successfully, the requirements in terms of assessing, selecting and training 
the Hungarian SOF operators cannot be waived. The vision stays invariable; only the right 
personnel could be able to learn and implement the necessary and vital SOF skills and 
complete the assigned tasks, and therefore finding, assessing, and selecting the right talent 
can ensure the future of the 2nd SOF Group. From there, the military organization must 
make sure that the right talent stays in the right position within the organization. As the 
first SOF core truth articulates, “The right people, highly trained and working as a team, 
will accomplish the mission with the equipment available.”172 Indeed, people with the right 
spirit, mental stamina and physical qualities will be needed even more in the future for the 
2nd SOF Group. Therefore, understanding the factors and drives which could motivate an 
individual to dedicate him- or herself to join this elite organization could be a major pillar 
to success. To that end, this thesis provides four possible innovative manning 
recommendations for the 2nd SOF Group manning.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The four hypotheses will be considered in the context of RAST-R to make
recommendations for the 2nd SOF Group, even with regard to how the brigade could 
propose its concepts to the higher command to develop manning processes. Of the four 
hypotheses, three are considered fully proven, while one is still partially acceptable as a 
feasible solution. 
172 Ibid., https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths 
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1. Improved recruitment and promotion processes, including research-based
and targeted recruiting involving the 2nd SOF Group, in parallel with robust
strategic communications and outreach processes.
The first hypothesis can be considered proven, in the light of the current external 
recruitment activities of 2nd SOF Group. Even though the 2nd SOF Group has official 
methods that allow recruiting externally, the brigade could be more proactive at pinpointing 
locations where potential volunteers could be found, and how to exploit these opportunities 
through in-person recruiting. On one hand, a list of prioritized target audiences could assist 
the brigade to suggest locations and events to the HDF where presence and capability 
demonstrations can bring real advantage to the 2nd Group. Also, this advantage could be 
exploited through the media products. Even if the recruiting event fails to attract the public 
enough and does not achieve a profit in terms of new volunteers, the occasion could be still 
profitable if high-quality media is produced for future use. Even if public advertising has 
undergone significant improvements in recent years, to maintain an attractive employer 
brand the expected reactions of the targeted audience should be taken into deliberation. 
Whether the brigade is promoting a featured capability presentation or a newly integrated 
technical equipment, the message should be carefully crafted to motivate the person to 
choose the 2nd SOF Group within the HDF. 
2. Improved pre-selection procedures organized by the 2nd SOF Group, also
an adaptive selection and SOBC system.
The second hypothesis can be considered fully substantiated. Although the current 
assessment procedures ensure that the volunteers deemed unsuitable will not be allowed to 
start the selection, the assessment opportunities are not deeply exploited. The survey 
proved, in part, that even the 2nd SOF Group could organize the assessment in the location 
of another military organization. The locally executed assessment could ensure a growing 
ratio of interest, not only because it could be more accessible for the soldiers, but also 
because the local approach could encourage the soldiers to attend who hesitated before or 
were simply not well informed. The offsite assessment method could carry recruiting 
potential also, because it can provide the credible information exchange between the 
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operators and inquiring soldiers to dispel the often harmful rumors about the 2nd SOF 
Group and its selection criteria.  
With regard to SOBC, I also consider the hypotheses to be acceptable. The ongoing 
large-scale force development and modernization program is constantly integrating new 
equipment into the HDF. This transformation affects HDF capabilities from the tactical 
level to the joint force aspect, where the 2nd SOF Group is designated to fulfill a strategic 
role. First, the SOBC could comply with the changes if the newly integrated equipment 
could affect the employability of the brigade. In light of the new equipment acquisition, 
the training techniques and procedures must be aligned if possible. Second, the younger 
generation is not only more receptive to high-tech equipment but are also more adaptable 
and are eager to be surrounded by the technology and tools of modern warfare. Therefore, 
as the SOBC cannot ignore the basic principles of rigorous training required for core 
activities, it must integrate the available new technological assets into the training topics 
on an ongoing basis. 
3. Increased salaries and benefits. 
The third hypothesis cannot be completely substantiated based on the research. 
However, the importance of financial benefits requires should be approached cautiously. 
The fact that the international survey did not prove salary as the key motivating factor in 
volunteering for SOF does not mean that the importance of financial benefits should be 
dismissed, especially in the current Hungarian market. Similar to the recent changes in 
social media presence, during my time of research another significant change occurred in 
the financial system of the 2nd SOF Group. In addition to the significant salary increases of 
previous years, an extra salary supplement was approved at the MoD level in September, 
exclusively for the SOTGs. This reason behind this governmental decision was valid: 
money is not the highest motivating factor for a young individual to join SOF, but in 
overall, the HDF must compete with the labor market competition to ensure enough 
recruits. The extra salary carries an extremely important message because only the soldiers 
who are SOBC qualified and are assigned in one of the SOTGs can receive it. This financial 
appreciation is hoped to also help internal recruitment towards RTGs.  
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4. Improved education and training activities regarding organizational culture
development.
The fourth hypothesis can be considered proven as a whole. Developing the current 
organizational culture poses a complex task for the 2nd SOF Group, but the process cannot 
be simply ordered. The improved working conditions, modernized equipment and the 
aligned TTPs are only slices of a whole spectrum of what needs to be revised. The real 
essence of the organizational culture change should appear also within the brigade, and this 
requires an alteration in the attitude of soldiers, but above all at the leadership level. As a 
recommendation, I would point out that it is not just the SOF operators who are a vital part 
of the brigade’s capability. Nor could the brigade ignore that the CS and CSS elements 
must be recruited, trained, and retained in their positions. Without their essential work—
often in the background—the 2nd SOF Group would not be able to perform its tasks. 
Therefore, the organizational culture must reflect their appreciation and organizational 
importance. The organizational culture should drive the constructive attitude within the 
organization as a common cause when facing challenges, to overcome internal problems. 
The unit patriotism between the two former battalions must be placed in a healthy 
bed. The absence of toxic leadership 173 and the supportive attitude of the members could 
encourage motivated soldiers to sign up for the SOAS. The inner movement, in terms of 
sustainable quantity and quality of personnel, could ensure more effective manning of the 
SOTGs. Therefore, the role of the 2nd SOF Group’s leadership—in both the SOTGs and 
the RTGs—is crucial to provide realistic options for the subordinates about a potential 
achievable career. Leaders must determine a realistic concept of the possible options 
according to the soldier’s ability and motivation, and superiors should support their desire 
for development. Toxic leadership at all levels of the hierarchy can prevent any individual 
from performing the position that he or she fulfills with enthusiasm. The positive internal 
attitude could allow the military organization to achieve and maintain a successful 




be in the right position. To achieve a more positive attitude requires time and cannot be 
forced. However, internal communication plays a crucial role in avoiding higher-than-
needed competition. Therefore, the different core tasks, operational roles and 
responsibilities of the RTGs and SOTGs should be emphasized and educated at the tactical 
level, along with the available career path.  
The accelerated digital development nowadays also affects the entire HDF. The 
largest-scale military technology development program for HDF is currently underway, 
but it is not just the so-called “hard” side of the developments that HDF and the 2nd SOF 
Group need to pay special attention to. Emphasizing and focusing on the human factor in 
the employer profile could be a crucial effort in this technologically developing 
environment. Lt. Col Pákozdi Márta and Lt. Col Torba Attila in the A Magyar Honvédség 
Személyi Állományának Motiváció Hierachiája refers to task allocating conference in 2018 
by the Commander of Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Forces Command (HDF JFC),174 
that the foresight of the coherence of technical developments parallel the organizational 
culture and the military personal cannot be underestimated. As part of the Zrínyi 2026 
Defense and Armed Forces Development Program, the acquisition of new technical 
equipment and devices, which meet the requirements of the age, will also require the 
transformation of the overall HDF, and therefore in the 2nd SOF Group as well. “Building 
and maintaining an employer-brand in the HDF should be treated as a much more complex 
process.”175 The organizational culture, social responsibility, daily routine of the 
employees, and the work atmosphere must be developed. Improved conditions and 
outreach toward the public can lead to a more complete picture of the given employer 
overall. This change should come from a higher individual and organizational interest and 
motivation to increase work performance and a sense of personnel satisfaction 
simultaneously. If these factors do not support each other, or the balance is not adequate 
enough, the chance of individual dissatisfaction or disillusionment can increase, and turn 
174 Based on the Annual Conference by the Chief of the HDF JFC on the 22nd of February in 2018. 
175 LtCol Pákozdi Márta – LtCol Torba Attila, „A Magyar Honvédség Személyi Állományának 
Motivációhierarchiája,” Motivation Hierarchy of the Personnel of the Hungarian Defence Forces 
(Honvédelmi Szemle 2020/2), 38. 
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into a main cause of fluctuation. According to Andó Sándor, the Chief Psychologist of the 
HDF, “one reason for employee fluctuation is that one does what likes, but not in that 
quality”.176  
To improve the organizational culture, a final aspect is recommended. The long 
years of intense involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in a hard-to-remove eye-
shade on the operators. The experience gained in COIN operations highly supported the 
confidence, tradecraft, and esteem in the operators and supportive members. At the time, 
the intense involvement in combat-mentoring missions and in TAA role placed the SOTUs 
in the focus, while the other CS and CSS elements were labeled as less important, mostly 
by the SOF operators. However, the changed security goals in CEE make it necessary to 
reconsider the brigade’s current and future profile in terms of employability, and this 
transformation should appear also at the tactical level. To achieve an effective 
transformation, communication and purposeful education are needed, not only to reduce 
the previously mentioned unit patriotism, but also to adapt the self-esteem, value and 
judgment of the CS and CSS elements within the organization. The current SOTG task-
organization could ensure the efficient and mission-focused mindset because the organic 
CS and CSS elements are working side by side daily. However, to improve effectiveness, 
leaders—at all levels—must prioritize organizational goals above the individual. The first 
and most important step in the development of the organizational culture is that the entire 
2nd SOF Group accepts the fact of the change ahead, and that it will affect all personnel. 
176 Ibid., 39. 
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APPENDIX  A. QUESTIONNAIRE 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
 
1. Within the past 5 to 10 years, has your SOF unit experienced any challenges to 
managing the minimum manning requirements due to the decreasing number of 
civilians, or active duty members who have volunteered to join your unit to become 
a SOF operator? 
 
 
2. Within the past 5 to 10 years has your SOF unit faced any challenges to filling the 
positions in your SOF teams with trained SOF operators due to increased exit-rate, 
as compared to the number of new SOF operators?  
 
 
3. Were the standards lowered in your unit, in terms of the basic volunteer 
requirements for entry (minimum years of service, age, etc.)? If yes please explain 
how, or in what ways? 
  
 
4. In terms of psychological and physical standards, has your unit lowered its 
standards to manage manning problems?  
 
 
5. In case of the lowered physical and mental standards, did your unit documented 
any changes to morale in your unit?  
 
 
6. If yes, has your unit experienced an increased exit-rate of the trained operators (who 
have years of experience and deployments)? 
 
 
7. Currently, in terms of age range which group describes best the majority of the new 
volunteers (even newly recruited ones, or those already in service) willing to join 








Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
18-22  
23-27  
28 and above  
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8. Currently, for those with prior military service, which group represents best the 








9. Do you have a SOF specific/focused recruitment process within your MoD/DOD? 
If yes, what specific elements/steps does this process involve? 
 
 




11. Based on your unit’s experience, which of the following methods are the most 
effective, and the least effective methods to recruit the volunteers? (Rate 1 as the 
most, and 9/10 as the least effective). 
 
 Official website 
 Printed media 
 Social media (please name the source(s)/platform(s):                                
 Recruiting offices 
 Involvement in job/carrier fairs 
 Personal contact between soldiers and civilians during daily life 
 Personal contact between active operators and other branch members in active duty 
 Advertising in schools (please describe the type of the school if possible):                       
 Public capability demonstrations, with dynamic shows, and equipment display 
 Other (please describe): 
 
12. Can your SOF unit be followed on social media? If yes, please name the type(s). If 
not, please explain why not. 
 
 
13. If your unit is active on social media, does your unit has the authority to manage 




Maximum 2 years  
3-5 years  
6 or more years  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
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14. Has your unit identified any motivational factors (wealth, patriotism, benefits) to 
drive individuals to volunteer for your SOF unit? (Rank them from the most 
motivational (1) to the least motivational (6). 
 
 Money 
 Excitement and challenge 
 Patriotism 
 Benefits (healthcare, housing, education, etc) 
 Brotherhood  
 Other (please describe/name it): 
 
ON ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION 
 
15. Does your unit conduct a pre-selection, such as any type of pre-emptive screening 
to assess the volunteers before starting the actual selection, or training? 
 
 
16. If yes, what skills are examined during the pre-selection? Mark your answer. 
 
 Physical capability 
 Psychological characteristic 
 Both (physical+psychological) 
 Other (please name it): 
 
17. Does your SOF unit organize a separate phase for a selection, or is this process an 
integrated part of the SOF basic/qualification training? 
 
 Yes, we have a separate selection before the training. 
 
No, we do not have a separate selection before starting the training, but the 
candidates have to pass successfully specific events during the course to 
graduate. 
 
18. What are the current minimum physical standards that volunteers must accomplish 
to begin your unit’s selection process? If your unit has a decisive scope for 
mental/psychological requirements, please describe it. 
 
19. Has your unit found these standards adequate to test the candidates’ initial capacity, 









     
Yes  No  
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20. If your answer is 3 or below, what could be the cause based on your unit’s 
assessment? 
 Requirements are excessively difficult.   
 Candidates are unable to meet the minimum requirements. 
 
21. Are the candidates aware of the expected standard requirements during the 
selection, or they are ordered/briefed to perform their maximum? 
 Candidates know the minimum standards during the selection. 
 Standards are secret, they have to do their best. 
 
22. Describe your current unit’s, or past unit’s existing selection process briefly. 
(Highlight some prioritized events if possible, such as long marches, enhanced 
sleep deprivation, cognitive tests, individual and team phases, etc). 
 
23. In the case of failing candidates, what were the main reasons your unit has 
documented for quitting during the selection in the past 5 to 10 years? Please rank 
the following from 1 to 6. 
 Physical capabilities 
 Lack of motivation and interest 
 Lack of mature and mental capabilities 
 Injuries 
 Social integration/fit-in problems 
 Other (please describe it):                                                                                                              
 
24. Based on your unit’s selection process, describe the phase/period that caused the 
most failure and voluntary withdrawal of candidates?  
 
25. If a candidate is injured during your unit’s selection, and the injury does not require 
hospitalization, can the candidate utilize a fixed duration-time break (medical hold), 
then continue the selection? 
 
 
26. Has your unit applied, or changed some policies/strategies in your unit’s selection 













27. Does your unit regularly organize a specific training (focusing on the characteristics 
of your unit’s selection) to increase the chance of the future members to pass the 
selection? If yes, please describe it briefly. 
 
 
28. How is your unit’s SOF basic training constructed by phases, or modules (e.g., land 
navigation, small unit training, close-quarters battle, Military Occupational 
Specialty- cross-training, etc)? Please describe briefly. 
 
29. Which of these modules/phases has your unit found to be the most difficult to pass 
for the candidates, and why? Please name and explain it. 
 
30. What is your unit’s policy on recycling, in the case of failed candidates? (repeat the 
whole training, or continue from the remaining phase at the next course) 
 
31. According to your unit’s record, which Military Occupational Specialty or specific 
national, SOF specialty (e.g., engineer/demolition, weapons specialist, medical 
specialist) are the most attractive for the candidates? If you can mention only the 
less attractive, please do so. 
 
32. Has your unit applied, or changed some policies/strategies in your unit’s SOF basic 





33. In the case of increasing exit-rate of the operators with years of experience and 
knowledge, what are their main explanations your unit has documented? Based on 
your unit’s experience, rate the reasons from the most to the least common. 
 
 High optempo causes too often overseas deployments and overstretch to the person 
 Local civilian factor ensures higher salary 
 He/she needs to spend more time with his/her family. 
 Lost his/her dedication, due to lowered bar, or altered requirements. 
 Physically not capable to perform in the teams, but refuses to accept staff assignment. 
 Private Military Companies are offering higher satisfactory options 
 He/she assumes that his/her options for further training/development/education are limited. 
Yes  No  
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34. Does your country’s MoD/DOD incorporate some programs -or plans- which 
prioritize SOF retention? If yes please describe some. 
 
 Yes  No  
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APPENDIX  B. SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Within the past 5 to 10 years, has your SOF unit experienced any challenges to 
managing the minimum manning requirements due to the decreasing number of 
civilians, or active duty members who have volunteered to join your unit to become 
a SOF operator? 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  Y 
NATO SOF C:  N 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
2. Within the past 5 to 10 years has your SOF unit faced any challenges to filling the 
positions in your SOF teams with trained SOF operators due to increased exit-rate, 
as compared to the number of new SOF operators?  
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  Y 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
3. Were the standards lowered in your unit, in terms of the basic volunteer 
requirements for entry (minimum years of service, age, etc.)? If yes please explain 
how, or in what ways? 
  
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  N 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
Yes 4 No 2 
Yes 5 No 1 
Yes 1 No 5 
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NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
NATO SOF A: „The selection process was re-evaluated and basically restructured. 
The main reason was not to lower the bar or requirements but to select the people 
who might or potentially have the SOF required capabilities. The real test actually 
continues after the selection when the new people go through Special Operator 
Basic Course (6-8 months). If the participants fail to successfully go through that 
course, they will not be accepted to the SOF. One of the main reasons for changing 
the old system of selecting people was that many very promising (right mindset; 
already possessed some specific knowledge – IT, technology) candidates got 
injured in the last phases of selection and thus eliminated from joining later.” 
 
4. In terms of psychological and physical standards, has your unit lowered its 
standards to manage manning problems?  
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  N 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
NATO SOF A: „Although it seems, that the standards (physical) were lowered in 
the selection, the candidates still have to successfully finish the 6–8 months SOBC 
course where standards are unchanged.” 
 
NATO SOF C: “Actually, the quality of personnel increased with more tailored 
selection and training.” 
 
5. In case of the lowered physical and mental standards, did your unit documented 
any changes to morale in your unit?  
 
 
NATO SOF A:  N 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  N 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  Y 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
Yes 1 No 5 
Yes 1 No 5 
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6. If yes, has your unit experienced an increased exit-rate of the trained operators (who 
have years of experience and deployments)? 
 
NATO SOF A:  N 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  N/A 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: „Our SOF organization has seen an increased exit-rate of 
trained operators for the last 10 years due to better salary offers coming from 
abroad such as the United Arab Emirates’ forces that currently have 3 battalions 
fully composed of former … SOF operators.” 
 
7. Currently, in terms of age range which group describes best the majority of the new 
volunteers (even newly recruited ones, or those already in service) willing to join 




NATO SOF A:  18-22 
NATO SOF B:  23-27 
NATO SOF C:  23-27 
NON-NATO SOF D:  23-27 
NON NATO SOF E:  18-22 
NON NATO SOF F:  23-27 
 
8. Currently, for those with prior military service, which group represents best the 




NATO SOF A:  maximum 2 years 
NATO SOF B:  3-5 years 
NATO SOF C:  3-5 years 
NON-NATO SOF D:  3-5 years 
NON NATO SOF E:  maximum 2 years 
Yes 1 No 4 
18-22 2 
23-27 4 
28 and above 0 
Maximum 2 years 2 
3-5 years 3 
6 or more years 1 
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NON NATO SOF F:  6 or more years 
 
ON RECRUITMENT 
9. Do you have a SOF specific/focused recruitment process within your MoD/DOD? 
If yes, what specific elements/steps does this process involve? 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  Y 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: „Anyone wishing to be part of our SOF has to pass a three-
month training equivalent to the U.S. Rangers. Civilians who directly apply to our 
SFO either pass the training and join or go home (They can not be recruited into 
other branches)” 
 
NATO SOF A: “Voluntary; no criminal background or any other obstacles 
(contact with foreign services) to be able to receive SECRET level 
access/certificate; MUST have gone through the conscription service (if civilians); 
the education level at least highschool (12 classes).” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: “We recruit officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO), and 
soldiers (Career or professionals, non-conscripts) with previous battlefield 
experience only. Thus, we have a recruitment system for officers and NCOs, and a 
second system for soldiers. For the former, we recruit only from the services …, 
based on personal contact between active operators and other branch members in 
active duty. After getting a list of recommended personnel, we request them to the 
specific service command and after approval, they are disposed to participate in 
our selection course. For the latter, soldiers are recruited only from the Army. We 
have a SOF recruitment committee that travels to different Army Divisions 
assessing different soldiers’ profiles. After a comprehensive evaluation, those 
selected are allowed to start the SOF selection course.” 
 
NATO SOF C: “A recruitment … has a specified program to promote new recruits 
to join. The recruitment … puts up advertisements in regular units, holds 
Yes 4 No 2 
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recruitment events, conducts face-to-face counseling, and offers monetary 
incentives to join SOF units. Once an interested recruit contacts the recruitment 
…, they set-up an assessment and selection process. This [process] takes about 2 
weeks of physical, psychological, and aptitude assessment to see whether the 
potential recruit is fit for the job. Once the recruit passes the [process], they go 
through a training pipeline (average around 9–15 months, depending the length of 
language training) to become an expert in a given field of job.” 
 
10. Is your unit, or SOF related element deliberately involved in this process? If yes, 
how? 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
NATO SOF A: „SOF related people are talking to the people interested in joining 
SOF (going through the Selection) before they enter the Selection process. The 
results of interviews will be given to the instructors of Selection that will already 
affect the person (with questionable values the person has to show extra value to 
successfully negotiate the course (the person himself does not know that of course.). 
Also, before the Selection actually starts, all the candidates’ background is 
investigated in Internal Security Service (domestic version of FBI) and the results 
will be analyzed and discussed internally in SOF board whether or not to allow the 
person to take part in Selection.” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: “The SOF organization provides a recruitment committee to 
assess and select candidates in different Army units.” 
 








Yes 4 No 2 
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11. Based on your unit’s experience, which of the following methods are the most 
effective, and the least effective methods to recruit the volunteers? (Rate 1 as the 
most, and 9/10 as the least effective). 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
7 5 9 7 - 2 Official website 
8 6 7 8 - 8 Printed media 
5 7 3 9 - 5 Social media (please name the source(s)/platform(s): 
9 2 6 4 - 4 Recruiting offices 
3 8 5 6 - 6 Involvement in job/carrier fairs 
1 3 2 7 - 7 Personal contact between soldiers and civilians during daily life 
2 1 1 2 1 3 Personal contact between active operators and other branch members in active duty 
6 9 8 3 - 9 Advertising in schools (please describe the type of the school if possible): 
4 4 4 5 - 10 Public capability demonstrations, with dynamic shows, and equipment display 
   1177 - 1178 Other (please describe): 
 
12. Can your SOF unit be followed on social media? If yes, please name the type(s). If 
not, please explain why not. 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y (Facebook) 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y (Facebook) 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: „Our Army (by army I include the navy and airforce as they 
fall under the command of the army) is very tight when it comes to publicly speaking 
about actions performed. We have a general website for all the army and a new 
phone application to communicate with the people in general. Every unit is not 
allowed to have its own social media connections.” 
 
NATO SOF A: “Facebook page has turned out to be very successful. Also, our 
people (anonymously) will write articles to domestic military magazines (very often 
these articles are cited or referenced to our main news pages or domains).” 
 
177 “Recruitment within the regular army.”  
178 “Personal interest, media exposure.” 
Yes 2 No 4 
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13. If your unit is active on social media, does your unit has the authority to manage 
and operate it? 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N/A 
NON NATO SOF E:  N/A 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
14. Has your unit identified any motivational factors (wealth, patriotism, benefits) to 
drive individuals to volunteer for your SOF unit? (Rank them from the most 
motivational (1) to the least motivational (6). 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
3 1 5 4 N/A 6 Money 
1 2 1 1 2 1 Excitement and challenge 
2 3 4 2 1 3 Patriotism 
5 4 3179 3 N/A 5 
Benefits (healthcare, housing, education, 
etc) 
4 5 2 5 3 4 Brotherhood  
   6180  2181 Other (please describe/name it): 
 
ON ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION 
15. Does your unit conduct a pre-selection, such as any type of pre-emptive screening 
to assess the volunteers before starting the actual selection, or training? 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  Y 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  Y 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
179 “Education, healthcare” 
180 “Oportunities to train abroad” 
181 “Career in the military” 
Yes 2 No 2 
Yes 6 No 0 
90 
16. If yes, what skills are examined during the pre-selection? Mark your answer. 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
      Physical capability 
  X182    Psychological characteristic 
X X  X183 X X Both (physical+psychological) 
     x184 Other (please name it): 
 
17. Does your SOF unit organize a separate phase for a selection, or is this process an 
integrated part of the SOF basic/qualification training? 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
X  X X X X Yes, we have a separate selection before the training. 
 X     
No, we do not have a separate selection 
before starting the training, but the 
candidates have to pass successfully 
specific events during the course to 
graduate. 
 
18. What are the current minimum physical standards that volunteers must accomplish 
to begin your unit’s selection process? If your unit has a decisive scope for 
mental/psychological requirements, please describe it. 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: “Volunteers are subjected to a PT test. Push ups, sit-ups, pull 
ups, running, and rope climbing. The test is a go/no go. Once the volunteers 
succeed, they have a medical examination. Only after that, they are allowed to enter 
the three-month training. Only graduates join the unit. Perhaps now, the standards 
are changing to meet the U.S. change in the selection process.” 
NON-NATO SOF F: “They must pass the land and water screening test (2-mile 
run, 2 min pushups,  2 min situps, pull-ups) and 1-mile swim. They must also pass 
the NP test from the nearest naval hospital.” 
NATO SOF A: „Minimum physical requirement is the necessary points in NATO 
physical test (I don’t remember exactly what were the minimum points). The pre-
Selection mental part will be covered in short interviews with candidates. These 
 
182 “Any specific knowledge, language,education…” 
183 “Ethical aspect is measured too.” 
184 “Aptitude.” 
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will be given to instructors of Selection. The candidates will go through several 
more mental/psychological and physical tests during the Selection. All successful 
participants after the Selection with their results in the Selection will go through 
separate meetings with the SOF board, where all the instructors together with SOF 
leadership discuss the details of the candidate performance, to decide whether he 
will be allowed to join the SOBC. If one of the instructors votes NO or has a 
negative opinion and he is able to justify the reason, the applicant will be denied.” 
NON-NATO SOF D: “The physical standards for candidates who wish to start the 
selection process are regulated by the Army’s physical training tables. The 
standards are directly related to the age of every person and the candidate must 
pass it with no less than 100%. As an example, to get a 100 % in his qualifications, 
a male 18–23 years-old must do: 60 push-ups in 1 minute, 65 sit-ups in 1 minute, 
run 2,400 meters (1.5 miles) in no more than 09:30, and 10 pull-ups.” 
NATO SOF B:  “a. Running 3000m -> less than 14min. 
  b. 1m run – 100 pull ups – 200 pushups- 300 squats – 1m run -> less than  
40min 
c.  Push ups more than 80 – rest 4min – sit ups more than 80 – rest 4min – pull 
ups more than 15 – rest 4min – climbing rope 6m without legs GO/NoGO – rest 
4min – Run 3,2 km less than 16min. 
d. March 24km with 30kgr rucksack -> less than 4h15min. 
e. Combat swim 1nm ->less than 55min.” 
NATO SOF C: “Volunteer need to score about 10% higher in the physical standard 
that of the regular units. We do IQ test, aptitude test, and psychological test to 
verify the trainability, potential, and aptitude of the person.” 
19. Has your unit found these standards adequate to test the candidates’ initial capacity, 
while also being realistically achievable for the candidates? Please mark the 
appropriate category. 




Disagree Strongly disagree 
„F”  X    
„A”  X    
„D” X     
„B”  X    
„E”  X    
„C” X     
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20. If your answer is 3 or below, what could be the cause based on your unit’s 
assessment? 
 
- Requirements are excessively difficult.   
- Candidates are unable to meet the minimum requirements. 
 
 
21. Are the candidates aware of the expected standard requirements during the 
selection, or they are ordered/briefed to perform their maximum? 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
X X  X X X Candidates know the minimum standards during the selection. 
  X  X X Standards are secret, they have to do their best. 
 
NATO SOF A: „The candidates know only the first, initial NATO physical test 
points requirement. Also that their background is checked (that they cannot have a 
criminal background).” 
 
NATO SOF B: „Both of these” 
 
NATO SOF C: „Both. Some testing, such as Army physical test is open for all to 
know, they will need to score the minimum requirements. But others, such as 
psychological, IQ, aptitude, teamwork, etc are not known to the recruits when they 
go through the selection process.” 
 
22. Describe your current unit’s, or past unit’s existing selection process briefly. 
(Highlight some prioritized events if possible, such as long marches, enhanced 
sleep deprivation, cognitive tests, individual and team phases, etc). 
NON-NATO SOF E: „The initial selection is based on passing the mental, 
physical, and medical tests. Once in the three-month training, each month has a 
theme. First month is the individual phase, the second is the team phase, and last 
is the patrol phase. If you fail after passing certain phases, you are allowed only 
once to continue from that phase in one later training. If you fail again, you repeat 
from the whole beginning.” 
NON-NATO SOF F: “Almost the same process with the „…” The difference 
between our „…” week is that we don’t allow our candidates to sleep for 6 days.” 
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NATO SOF A: „The candidates will go through basically two main phases in 
Selection. Individual and Team phases. In the individual phase their physical, 
mental, stress level, uniqueness capabilities are tested constantly. In the Team 
phase the candidate’s leader skills, participation will and ability to sacrifice for the 
team is tested and evaluated.” 
NON NATO SOF D: „Our initial selection process is composed of three different 
combat courses conducted by the Army’s training center: Airborne, “…” (Similar 
to the Ranger course in the U.S. but more adapted to our environment and warfare), 
and Special Forces. In order to get approval, the candidate must approve all three 
courses successfully. The “…” and Special Forces courses are the most demanding 
both physically and psychologically. They include a great number of long runs, 
long marches with heavy weights, and constant pressure from instructors. Sleep 
deprivation is always present, especially in the first weeks of both courses. Another 
significant part of the training is the laboratory for resistance, evasion, and escape. 
For officers and NCOs, planning and conduction of units play a big role in their 
final assessment. After approving these three courses, the candidate is now part of 
the special forces organization and is allowed to enter a two-month special training 
conducted by the Special Operations Training Battalion in which personnel learns 
the basic SOF skills.” 
NATO SOF B: “a. long marches 
   b. enhanced sleep deprivation 
   c. cognitive tests 
   d. psychometrically tests 
   e. SERE” 
NATO SOF C: „Recruits conduct physical test on the first day of the 2 week long 
selection process. They conduct ruck marches without specified distances. They 
also do a lot of team challenges where instructors assess each individual’s ability 
to work in teams. They do nightly essay writing on general issues to check their 
ability to write and communicate properly. They do group discussion and debates 
on a given theme to assess their ability to world in teams, social interactions, ability 
to make sound judgements, and verbal communication abilities. Military tactical 
trainings such as weapons, unit maneuver, and team problem solving are also part 
of the assessment week.” 
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23. In the case of failing candidates, what were the main reasons your unit has 
documented for quitting during the selection in the past 5 to 10 years? Please rank 
the following from 1 to 6. 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”   
1 3 3 2 3 1 Physical capabilities 
3 2 ½ 3 1 4 Lack of motivation and interest 
4 4 4 4 2 5 Lack of mature and mental capabilities 
2 1 ½ 1 4 2 Injuries 
5 5 5 5 5 3 Social integration/fit-in problems 
- - - - - - Other (please describe it):                                                                                                              
 
 
24. Based on your unit’s selection process, describe the phase/period that caused the 
most failure and voluntary withdrawal of candidates?  
 
NON-NATO SOF E: „The start of the process. Talking about how demanding the 
training is one thing, but experiencing it is another; most quitters report that they 
did not expect this hard training and/or their bodies could not handle it. Near the 
end, few withdraw and it is mostly injuries. 
 
NON NATO SOF F: “Motivation Phase – Conditioning and physical training (hell 
week)” 
 
NATO SOF A: „The first 3 days when it is not even difficult yet (the people with 
the wrong mindset and illusions will drop out). The last phase – injuries (this is the 
reason, why people with possible right mindset mainly dropped out and the 
Selection was restructured).” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: „Candidates often fail during the Airborne course due to 
injuries while jumping, or fear of heights. In the remaining two courses, candidates 
usually fail in the first weeks of lancero and SOF course since these are the weeks 
in which they are under more pressure both physically and psychologically (sleep 
deprivation usually comes to 2 hours per day during the first 3–4 weeks of every 
course).” 
 
NATO SOF C: “Physical injuries due to excessive training.” 
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25. If a candidate is injured during your unit’s selection, and the injury does not require 
hospitalization, can the candidate utilize a fixed duration-time break (medical hold), 
then continue the selection? 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  N 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  Y 
 
NON-NATO F: „But only for 72 hours during normal phase. During … week, I 
remember only 4 hours. If they exceed they are dropped from training.” 
 
 
26. Has your unit applied, or changed some policies/strategies in your unit’s selection 
procedure in the past 5 to 10 years which caused an increased success ratio? Please 
describe briefly. 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: „The trainers were very hard on the process and most of the 
graduates experienced body injuries at a certain point of their career. For that, the 
recruitment process was studied and was more systemized in the last 6 or so years 
to reach a point where the graduates are physically able but at the same time not 
permanently injured in the process.” 
 
NON-NATO F: “None, culture is still traditional. I was the director of the school 
for 7 months before coming here to NPS. My time is not enough to make changes 
and its because the culture of instructors and leadership was still traditional.” 
 
NATO SOF A: „Answer 3.” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: „Yes, we are working on a new model in which a committee 
of 3–4 officers and NCOs are assessing candidates directly from the Corporals’ 
academy. After a long and comprehensive assessment, candidates that demonstrate 
to have a SOF profile and voluntarily, are allowed to enter the selection process. 
However, due to their lack of tactical and technical expertise, these personnel if 
approve the selection process, will work in SOF support areas such as the Training 
Battalion or so, while continue to train and develop the required skills to be a SOF 
operator.” 
Yes 2 No 4 
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ON TRAINING 
27. Does your unit regularly organize a specific training (focusing on the characteristics 
of your unit’s selection) to increase the chance of the future members to pass the 
selection? If yes, please describe it briefly. 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  N 
NON-NATO SOF D:  N 
NON NATO SOF E:  Y 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
 
NATO SOF A: „Starting from this year, the SOF has its own dedicated and selected 
conscripts and also continues to train dedicated SOF supporting units in voluntary 
national militarized organization – “…” (somewhat similar to National Guard).” 
 
28. How is your unit’s SOF basic training constructed by phases, or modules (e.g., land 
navigation, small unit training, close-quarters battle, Military Occupational 
Specialty- cross-training, etc)? Please describe briefly. 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: “The initial selection is based on passing the mental, 
physical, and medical tests. Once in the three-month training, each month has a 
theme. First month is individual phase, second is the team phase, and last is the 
patrol phase. If you fail after passing certain phases, you are allowed only once to 
continue from that phase in one later training. If you fail again, you repeate from 
the whole beginning.” 
NON-NATO SOF F: “Motivation phase, Hydrorecon phase, Diving Phase, 
Demolition phase, “…” tactics phase, Airborne phase.” 
NATO SOF A: “Exactly as you provided the example - land navigation, small unit 
training, close quarters battle, Military Occupational Specialty- cross training.” 
NON-NATO SOF D „First two weeks, the course will focus on individual skills, 
such as physical training, specialists (weapons, comms, medics. Etc.), and lectures 
of land navigation. The next phase they will work at a squad level on exercises of 
land navigation, shooting all types of weapons and all environments including close 
combat, survivability, and insertion/extraction methods (rappel, fast rope, helocast, 
Yes 2 No 4 
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SPIES). Finally, the group will conduct several patrol exercises making emphasis 
on infiltration and actions on the objective.” 
NATO SOF B: “The selection phase and then by modules.” 
NATO SOF C: “ORIENTATION – PHASE 1 (2 Weeks)>SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
LANGUAGE TRAINING – PHASE 2 (25 Weeks)>SPECIALIST/OFFICER 
COURSE – PHASE 3 (6 Weeks)>REGIONAL ANALYSIS – PHASE 4 (4 
Weeks)>INTERAGENCY TRAINING – PHASE 5 (4 Weeks)>GRADUATION (1 
Week).” 
29. Which of these modules/phases has your unit found to be the most difficult to pass 
for the candidates, and why? Please name and explain it. 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: “Each phase has its demands and obstacles. Mostly, the 
individual phase because of the lack of team encouragement and brotherhood. In 
addition, during this phase, the unprepared volunteers have body failures or 
injuries that throws them out of the training.” 
NATO SOF A: “Maybe Small Unit Training, because the demands are high and the 
training phase quite long. The candidates’ leader skills, endurance and uniqueness 
are put on real test there.” 
NON-NATO SOF D: “At this point of training, we have seen a reduction in the 
personnel failing the process due to the high standards applied in the first selection 
process. However, the ones who failed usually do it due to lack of technical skills, 
especially in close combat (shooting), or because an injury which is the most often 
cause of failing at this point of selection.” 
NATO SOF B: “Comms -> technical issues, CQB -> failed to follow the rules” 
NATO SOF C: „SPECIALIST/OFFICER COURSE – PHASE 3 (6 Weeks), because 
it involves a series of aptitude test/training where students fail and get recycled but 
they rarely quit.” 
30. What is your unit’s policy on recycling, in the case of failed candidates? (repeat the 
whole training, or continue from the remaining phase at the next course) 
 
NON-NATO SOF E: „At the next course, the volunteer starts from the beginning 
of the phase that he failed. If he fails again (in that phase or any later one before 
finishing the whole training), he is back to point Zero. From there, any future 
training starts from the whole beginning.” 
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NON-NATO SOF F: „They go back one phase when they rejoin the succeeding 
class.” 
 
NATO SOF A: „The candidate’s reason for failing is discussed in SOF board and 
when it’s not motivational the candidate is usually given one more chance in the 
next course (starting from where he failed). If its motivational or second failure, 
the candidate will be wished good luck in his future other adventures.” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: „If the reason for failing was medical, the candidates have 
the chance to resume their process only on every previously completed phase. If a 
phase was not previously completed, then the candidate needs to start over that 
specific phase and complete the remaining ones.” 
NATO SOF B: “Re-test the module and if he fails is OUT, he has to do the whole 
stuff from the beginning.” 
NATO SOF C: „Recycle only the portion that the student has failed. However, if 
the candidate fails for the second time, he/she will be denied further training, 
effectively terminating the candidacy and sent back to their regular/originating 
unit.” 
 
31. According to your unit’s record, which Military Occupational Specialty or specific 
national  SOF specialty (e.g., engineer/demolition, weapons specialist, medical 
specialist) are the most attractive for the candidates? If you can mention only the 
less attractive, please do so. 
NON-NATO SOF E: “Most of the candidates want to fight and shoot. For that they 
mostly avoid medical specialist positions. We assign them to do that training, and 
probably not the best in the unit take this job although it is a very important job” 
NON-NATO SOF F: “… operator.” 
NATO SOF A: “No 1 is usually the weapons specialist. Recently also comms (to 
my surprise) has been pretty popular. There really has not been least attractive, as 
much as I have seen or heard.” 
NON-NATO SOF D: “Medics is the most attractive specialty for candidates and 
engineers/demolitions are the least.” 
NATO SOF B: “Weapons specialist, than jumps specialist.” 
NATO SOF C: “N/A” 
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32. Has your unit applied, or changed some policies/strategies in your unit’s SOF basic 
training in the past 5 to 10 years which caused an increased success ratio? Please 
describe briefly. 
NON-NATO SOF E: „I believe not. The training is still the same but with newer 
methods.” 
NON-NATO SOF F: “Yes, got rid of Hell blast and all hands are available during 
exercises especially at night to prevent accidental deaths.” 
NATO SOF A: „Yes, but I think it’s classified.” 
NON NATO SOF D: N/A. 
NATO SOF B: „No.” 
NATO SOF C: „No.” 
ON RETENTION 
33. In the case of increasing exit-rate of the operators with years of experience and 
knowledge, what are their main explanations your unit has documented? Based on 
your unit’s experience, rate the reasons from the most to the least common. 
 
„E” „F” „A” „D” „B” „C”  
- 7 6 2 - 2 High optempo causes too often overseas deployments and overstretch to the person 
5 1 2 3 - 6 Local civilian factor ensures higher salary 
3 2 1 4 2 1 He/she needs to spend more time with his/her family. 
6 3 7 7 3 - Lost his/her dedication, due to lowered bar, or altered requirements. 
1 4 5 6 1 4 
Physically not capable to perform in the 
teams, but refuses to accept staff 
assignment. 
4 6 4 1 - 5 Private Military Companies are offering higher satisfactory options 
4 5 3 5 4 3 
He/she assumes that his/her options for 







34. Does your country’s MoD/DOD incorporate some programs -or plans- which 
prioritize SOF retention? If yes please describe some. 
 
 
NATO SOF A:  Y 
NATO SOF B:  N 
NATO SOF C:  Y 
NON-NATO SOF D:  Y 
NON NATO SOF E:  N 
NON NATO SOF F:  N 
 
NATO SOF A: „The SOF has the vital task in our domestic military strategy 
against …. Elimination of SOF would mean the restructuring of military strategy.” 
 
NON-NATO SOF D: „The MoD in coordination with the services´ commanders 
dedicate a special budget and offer better opportunities for further education and 
specialized training both abroad and locally.” 
 
NATO SOF C: „Monetary incentive offers (bonuses) and faster career progression 
offers.” 
Yes 3 No 3 
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